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title: "Automated License Plate Readers"
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source: "https://sls.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs"
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author:
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published:
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created: 2026-08-19
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description: "Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are high-speed, computer-controlled camera systems that are typically mounted on street poles, streetlights, highway overpasses, mobile trailers, or attached to police squad cars. ALPRs automatically capture all license plate numbers that come into view, along with the location, date, and time. The data, which includes..."
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tags:
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- "clippings"
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---
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Automated License Plate Readers | Street Level Surveillance
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Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are high-speed, computer-controlled camera systems that are typically mounted on street poles, streetlights, highway overpasses, mobile trailers, or attached to police squad cars. ALPRs automatically capture all license plate numbers that come into view, along with the location, date, and time. The data, which includes photographs of the vehicle and sometimes its driver and passengers, is then uploaded to a central server.
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[Vendors say](https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/) that the information collected can be used by police to find out where a plate has been in the past to determine whether a vehicle was at the scene of a crime, to identify travel patterns, and even to discover vehicles that may be associated with each other. Law enforcement agencies can choose to [share their information with thousands of other agencies](https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/nation/california/2023/11/14/california-police-face-new-limits-in-sharing-automated-license-plate-reader-alpr-location-data/71574307007/).
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Taken in the aggregate, ALPR data can paint an intimate portrait of a driver’s life and even chill First Amendment protected activity. ALPR technology can be used to target drivers who visit sensitive places such as health centers, immigration clinics, gun shops, union halls, protests, or centers of religious worship.
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Drivers have no control over whether their vehicle displays a license plate because the government requires all car, truck, and motorcycle drivers to display license plates in public view. So it’s particularly disturbing that automatic license plate readers are used to track and record the movements of millions of ordinary people, even though the overwhelming majority are not connected to a crime.
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### How ALPR Systems Work
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Automated license plate readers can be broadly divided into three categories.
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#### Stationary or Fixed ALPR cameras
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Photo by Mike Katz-Lacabe (CC BY) Stationary or fixed automated license plate readers
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These are installed in a fixed location, such as a traffic light, a telephone pole, the entrance of a facility, or a freeway exit ramp. These cameras generally capture only vehicles in motion that pass within view.
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If multiple stationary ALPR cameras are installed along a single thoroughfare, the data can reveal what direction and what speed a car is traveling. With enough cameras, police can track a vehicle in real-time. If the data is stored over time, they can reveal every time a particular plate has passed a given location, allowing the government to infer that the driver likely lives or works close by. Smaller municipalities often install ALPR cameras at the entrances and exits to the town, creating a virtual gated community no one can visit without being documented. Police will sometimes disguise ALPRs as mundane objects, such as traffic cones or [cacti](https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/scottsdale/2015/05/11/paradise-valley-license-plate-camera-reader/27144369/).
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ALPR cameras are often used in conjunction with automated red-light and speed enforcement systems, and also as a means of assessing tolls on roads and bridges.
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#### Mobile ALPR cameras
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Photo by Mike Katz-Lacabe (CC BY) Mobile automated license plate reader
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Mobile ALPRs are often attached to police patrol cars, allowing law enforcement officers to capture data from license plates as they drive around the city throughout their shifts. In most cases, these cameras are turned on at the beginning of a shift and not turned off again until the end of the shift.
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In addition to capturing images of passing vehicles, mobile ALPR cameras are effective at capturing license plates of parked cars. For example, a patrol car may drive around a public parking lot capturing hundreds of vehicles’ plates in minutes.
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Police can also use ALPRs for " [gridding](https://www.azmirror.com/2019/07/08/arizona-police-agencies-gather-share-license-plate-data-but-few-ensure-rules-are-being-followed/)." This involves an ALPR-equipped vehicle systematically driving up and down every block of neighborhood to capture intelligence on residents.
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Also, private vendors like Vigilant Solutions capture plate data with mobile ALPRs and then sell that data to police agencies and others.
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#### ALPR Trailers
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Photo by Mike Katz-Lacabe (CC BY) A Walnut Creek Police Department ALPR trailer
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ALPRs are also available as [trailers](https://www.cehrp.org/tags/lpr-speed-trailer/) that police can tow to particular areas and leave for extended periods of time. These collect data in a similar fashion as fixed ALPRs, without police having to permanently install the cameras. The [Drug Enforcement Administration](https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2018/10/dea-plans-to-expand-license-plate-surveillance-program/) has purchased these systems in the past, disguised as speed enforcement trailers, in order to track vehicles in areas along the U.S.-Mexico border. Trailers, or vehicles equipped with ALPR, have also been parked by police near [gun shows](https://www.wsj.com/articles/gun-show-customers-license-plates-come-under-scrutiny-1475451302) and [political](http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2013/va-alpr.pdf) [rallies](http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/42/4232.asp).
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#### ALPR Databases
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Most of this ALPR data is stored in databases for extended periods of time—often as long as five years. The databases may be maintained by the police departments, but often they are maintained by private companies such as Vigilant Solutions or Flock Safety. Law enforcement agencies without their own ALPR systems can access data collected by other law enforcement agencies through regional sharing systems and networks operated by these private companies. Several companies operate independent, non-law enforcement ALPR databases, contracting with drivers to put cameras on private vehicles to collect the information. These data are then sold to companies like insurers, but law enforcement can also purchase access to this commercial data on a subscription basis.
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#### Hotlists
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Law enforcement agencies will often pre-load a list of license plates that the ALPR system is actively looking for—such as stolen vehicles and vehicles associated with outstanding warrants. Police officers can also create their own hotlists. If the ALPR camera scans a plate on the list, the system sends an alert to the officer in the squad car (if it's a mobile reader) or the agency (if it's a fixed reader). Some hotlists include low-level misdemeanors and traffic offenses. Some agencies use these hotlists to generate revenue by stopping citation scofflaws.
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### What Kinds of Data an ALPR Collects
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ALPRs collect license plate numbers and location data along with the exact date and time the license plate was encountered. Some systems are able to capture make and model of the vehicle. [They can collect thousands of plates per minute.](http://www.policemag.com/channel/technology/articles/2016/04/lpr-technology.aspx) One vendor brags that its dataset includes more than [6.5 billion scans](http://drndata.com/) and grows at a rate of [120-million data points](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-have-helped-police-and-lenders-target-the-poor/479436/) each month.
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When combined, ALPR data can reveal the direction and speed a person traveled through triangulation. In aggregate over time, the data can reveal a vehicle’s historical travel. With algorithms applied to the data, the systems can reveal regular travel patterns and predict where a driver may be in the future. The data also reveal all visitors to a particular location.
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The data generally does not include the driver’s name. However, law enforcement officers can use other databases to connect individual names with their license plate numbers.
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In addition to capturing license plate data, the photographs can reveal [images](https://ncric.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/California-Law-Enforcement-ALPR-FAQ.pdf) of [the vehicle](https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2464672/ELSAG%20Brochures%205-15-17/M6-ss-150dpi.pdf), the vehicle’s [drivers and passengers](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247283.pdf), as well as [its immediate surroundings](http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/License-plate-readerstracking-cars-4622476.php) —and even [people getting in and out](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443995604578004723603576296) of a vehicle. Some products create "vehicle fingerprints" that also include information such as the vehicle's color, make, model, physical damage, and bumper stickers.
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### How Law Enforcement Uses ALPR Technology
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This embed will serve content from [www.youtube-nocookie.com](https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/FqMkIsUmPcI?rel=0).
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*A time-lapse visualization of the data collected by Oakland Police Department vehicles mounted with license plate readers.*
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ALPR data is gathered indiscriminately, collecting information on millions of ordinary people. By plotting vehicle times and locations and tracing past movements, police can use stored data to paint a very specific portrait of drivers’ lives, determining past patterns of behavior and possibly [even predicting future ones](https://www.eff.org/files/2017/02/22/neal_v._fairfax_pd_-_eff_amicus_brief_file_endorsed.pdf) —in spite of the fact that the vast majority of people whose license plate data is collected and stored have not even been accused of a crime. Without ALPR technology, law enforcement officers must collect license plates by hand. This creates practical limitations on the amount of data that can be collected and means officers must make choices about which vehicles they are going to track. ALPR technology removes those limitations and allows officers to track everyone, allowing for faster and broader collection of license plates with far reduced staffing requirements.
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[A report by EFF in 2021](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/data-driven-2-california-dragnet-new-dataset-shows-scale-vehicle-surveillance) found that according to data from 63 law enforcement agencies in California, only 0.05% of the data collected by ALPRs was relevant to a public safety interest at the time the data was captured.
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Law enforcement has two general purposes for using license plate readers.
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#### Real-time investigations
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By adding a license plate to a “hot list,” officers can use ALPR to automatically identify or track particular vehicles in real time. Licenses plates are often added to hot lists because the vehicle is stolen or associated with an outstanding warrant. Officers may also add a plate number to the list if the vehicle has been seen at the scene of a crime, the owner is a suspect in a crime, or the vehicle is believed to be associated with a gang. Hot lists often include low-level offenses, too.
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#### Historical investigations
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Since ALPRs typically collect information on everyone—not just hot-listed vehicles—officers can use a plate, a partial plate, or a physical address to search and analyze historical data. For example, an officer may enter the location of a convenience store to identify vehicles seen nearby at the time of a robbery. The officer can then look up those plate numbers to find other locations that plate has been captured.
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Training materials, policies and laws in some jurisdictions instruct officers that a hot-list alert on its own may not be enough to warrant a stop. Officers are instructed to visually confirm that a plate number is a match. Failure to manually confirm, combined with machine error, has caused wrongful stops.
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Law enforcement claims that ALPR data has been used to, for example, recover stolen cars or find abducted children. However, police have also used ALPR data for mass enforcement of less serious offenses, such as searching for uninsured or [tracking down individuals with overdue court fees](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/no-cost-license-plate-readers-are-turning-texas-police-mobile-debt-collectors-and).
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The length of time that ALPR data is retained varies from agency to agency, from as short as mere days to as long as several years, although some entities—including private companies—may retain the data indefinitely.
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### Who Sells ALPR Technology
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[Vigilant Solutions](https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/) (a subsidiary of Motorola Solutions) and Flock Safety are two of the most common ALPR vendors in the United States. Other vendors include Rekor, Elsag, Axon, Perceptics, and Jenoptik.
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Vigilant Solutions, through its sister company Digital Recognition Network, offers access to data it has privately collected through partnerships with repossession companies, who passively collect ALPR through their own vehicles. Flock Safety similarly has arranged partnerships with a large number of [homeowners associations](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/flock-license-plate-reader-homeowners-association-safe-problems) that provide data to law enforcement. Both companies offer law enforcement the ability to share data with each other across the country.
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### Threats Posed by ALPR
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ALPR is a powerful surveillance technology that can be used to invade the privacy of individuals as well as to violate the rights of entire communities.
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Law enforcement agencies have abused this technology. Police officers in New York drove down a street and [electronically recorded the license plate numbers of everyone parked near a mosque](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997.html). Police in Birmingham [targeted a Muslim community](https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/25/birmingham-cctv-muslim-areas-surveillance) while misleading the public about the project. ALPR data [EFF obtained from the Oakland Police Department](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data) showed that police disproportionately deploy ALPR-mounted vehicles in low-income communities and communities of color.
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Moreover, many individual officers have abused law enforcement databases, including license plate information and records held by motor vehicle departments. In 1998, a Washington, D.C. police officer “ [pleaded guilty to extortion](https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443995604578004723603576296) after looking up the plates of vehicles near a gay bar and blackmailing the vehicle owners.” More recently, [an officer in Kechi, Kansas](https://www.kwch.com/2022/11/04/kechi-police-lieutenants-arrest-puts-flock-technology-under-scrutiny/) was arrested on suspicion of accessing a Flock Safety ALPR database to stalk his estranged wife.
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In addition to deliberate misuse, ALPRs sometimes misread plates, [leading to dire consequences](https://www.aclu.org/blog/san-francisco-woman-pulled-out-car-gunpoint-because-license-plate-reader-error). In 2009, San Francisco police pulled over Denise Green, an African-American city worker, handcuffed her at gunpoint, forced her to her knees, and searched both her and her vehicle—all because her car was misidentified as stolen due to a license plate reader error. Her experience led the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to rule that technology alone can’t be the basis of such a stop, but that judgment does not apply everywhere, leaving people vulnerable to similar law enforcement errors. More recently, [in Aurora, Colorado](https://www.denver7.com/news/local-news/aurora-police-detain-black-family-after-mistaking-their-vehicle-as-stolen) a group of Black youths were traumatized by police after an ALPR system incorrectly identified their vehicle as stolen.
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Aggregate data stored for lengthy periods of time (or indefinitely) becomes more invasive and revealing, and it is susceptible to both misuse and data breach. Even Customs & Border Protection, arguably the largest and best funded law enforcement agency in the U.S., saw its ALPR vendor, Perceptics, [hacked and data published online](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/02/border-surveillance-subcontractor-suspended-after-cyberattack-misuse-traveler-images/). Sensible retention limits, specific policies about who inside an agency is allowed to access data, and audit and control processes could help minimize these issues. One of the better privacy protections would be for police to retain no information at all when a passing vehicle does not match a hot list.
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Automated license plate readers can also be used to target [immigrant communities](https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/documents-reveal-ice-using-driver-location-data) and people seeking or providing [reproductive health services](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/09/automated-license-plate-readers-threaten-abortion-access-heres-how-policymakers).
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### EFF’s Work on ALPR
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EFF has been investigating and combating the privacy threats of ALPR technology through public records requests, litigation, and legislative advocacy since 2012.
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#### ALPR Litigation
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EFF and the ACLU of Southern California [sued the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the Los Angeles Police Department](https://www.eff.org/cases/automated-license-plate-readers-aclu-eff-v-lapd-lasd) after the agencies refused to hand over ALPR data. The agencies claimed the records were exempt from the California Public Records Act because they were investigative records. This argument amounts to claiming that all Los Angelenos are under investigation, a point that both a lawyer for the LAPD and a California Supreme Court Justice agreed sounded “Orwellian” during oral arguments. In 2017, the California Supreme Court [ruled](https://www.eff.org/press/releases/electronic-frontier-foundation-aclu-win-court-ruling-police-cant-keep-license-plate) in EFF and ACLU’s favor and ordered the case back to the Superior court.
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EFF and the ACLU also sued the Marin County Sheriff's Office in 2021 on behalf of local activists in *[Lagleva v. Marin County Sheriff](https://www.eff.org/cases/lagleva-v-marin)*. The sheriff had been sharing data collected through ALPRs with out-of-state agencies, including Immigration & Customs Enforcement, in violation of laws regulating ALPR use and prohibiting the sharing of criminal justice data for immigration enforcement. As part of a [settlement](https://www.eff.org/press/releases/community-activists-reach-settlement-marin-county-sheriff-unlawfully-sharing-drivers), the sheriff agreed to cease sharing data outside of California.
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Outside of California, [EFF has filed briefs](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/virginia-supreme-court-should-protect-drivers-license-plate-surveillance) in a lawsuit over the excessive storage collection of ALPR data in the state of Virginia, as well as briefs in cases in [Massachusetts and Nevada](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/courts-issue-rulings-two-cases-challenging-law-enforcement-searches-license-plate).
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#### ALPR Accountability and Transparency
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In 2015, the California legislature passed S.B. 34, a bill that requires ALPR users to protect data, maintain access logs, hold public meetings before starting an ALPR program, implement a usage and privacy policy, and maintain access logs. The law also prohibits public agencies from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR data except to other public agencies.
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EFF has coordinated volunteers to collect [ALPR policies across the state of California](https://www.eff.org/pages/california-automated-license-plate-reader-policies) and to [expose agencies failing to comply with the law](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/here-are-79-policies-california-surveillance-tech-where-are-other-90). EFF has also independently filed public records requests with dozens of agencies to shine light on their use of ALPR data through our [Data Driven](https://www.eff.org/pages/what-we-learned) and [Data Driven 2](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/data-driven-2-california-dragnet-new-dataset-shows-scale-vehicle-surveillance) projects.
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In 2019, EFF [successfully advocated](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/victory-california-orders-state-audit-automated-license-plate-readers) for the California Legislature to order an audit of several law enforcement agencies' compliance with S.B. 34. As a result, the California State Auditor [issued a scathing report](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/02/california-auditor-releases-damning-report-about-law-enforcements-use-automated) substantiating many of EFF's concerns that agencies weren't following the law, failing to enact adequate policies, and sharing data far too broadly.
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### EFF Legal Cases
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[ACLU of Southern California and EFF v. LAPD and LASD](https://www.eff.org/foia/automated-license-plate-readers)
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[Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department](https://www.eff.org/cases/neal-v-fairfax-county-police-department)
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[Lagleva v. Marin County Sheriff](https://www.eff.org/cases/lagleva-v-marin)
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[United States v. Yang](https://www.eff.org/document/united-states-v-yang-ninth-circuit-opinion-alprs)
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[Commonwealth v. McCarthy](https://www.eff.org/document/commonwealth-v-mccarthy-massachusetts-supreme-judicial-court-alprs)
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[People v. Gonzales](https://www.eff.org/document/eff-amicus-brief-people-v-gonzales-alprs)
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### Suggested Additional Reading
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[You Are Being Tracked](https://www.aclu.org/feature/you-are-being-tracked) (ACLU)
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[License Plate Readers for Law Enforcement Opportunities and Obstacles](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247283.pdf) (RAND Corporation)
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[Automated License Plate Readers Threaten Our Privacy](https://eff.org/ALPRprimer) (EFF/ACLU)
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[The Four Flavors of Automated License Plate Reader Technology](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/04/four-flavors-automated-license-plate-reader-technology) (EFF)
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[Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations) (Brennan Center)
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[Things to Know Before Your Neighborhood Installs an Automated License Plate Reade](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/flock-license-plate-reader-homeowners-association-safe-problems) r (EFF)
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[Automated License Plate Readers Threaten Abortion Access. Here's How Policymakers Can Mitigate the Risk](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/09/automated-license-plate-readers-threaten-abortion-access-heres-how-policymakers) (EFF)
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[Data Driven: Explore How Cops Are Collecting and Sharing Our Travel Patterns Using Automated License Plate Readers](https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-reader-dataset) (EFF)
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[Data Driven 2: California Dragnet—New Data Set Shows Scale of Vehicle Surveillance in the Golden State](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/data-driven-2-california-dragnet-new-dataset-shows-scale-vehicle-surveillance) (EFF)
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[How to Pump the Brakes on Your Police Department’s Use of Flock’s Mass Surveillance License Plate Readers](https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-to-pump-the-brakes-on-your-police-departments-use-of-flocks-mass-surveillance-license-plate-readers) (ACLU)
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[Automated License Plate Readers: To Better Protect Individuals’ Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects](https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/index.html) (California State Auditor)
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*Most recently updated October 1, 2023*
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[Technologies](https://sls.eff.org/)
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---
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title: "Common Questions, Arguments, & Responses when discussing Flock Surveillance"
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source: "https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Common_Questions,_Arguments,_%26_Responses_when_discussing_Flock_Surveillance#cite_note-fox11-menasha-2"
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author:
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- "[[Consumer Rights Wiki]]"
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published: 2026-08-13
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created: 2026-08-19
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description: "Police have held innocent drivers at gunpoint, handcuffed a 12-year-old, and tracked ex-partners with automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems. In three Colorado..."
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tags:
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- "clippings"
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---
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Police have held innocent drivers at gunpoint, handcuffed a 12-year-old, and tracked ex-partners with automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems.[^1] [^2] In three Colorado cases documented below, the flag came from the state crime database that feeds the alert list, where a court clerk and two police departments had entered plate data that pointed at the wrong vehicle; one of those entries sat uncorrected for nearly two years.[^3] [^4] The documented incidents fall into [false positives and system failures](#False_positives_and_system_failures), where the system flagged the wrong vehicle or the wrong person, and [misuse by officers with account access](#Law_enforcement_misuse_and_stalking_incidents); the sections after those answer the arguments most often raised in favor of these deployments.
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| Jurisdiction | Year | What happened | Mechanism |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| | 2018 | [Privacy advocate Brian Hofer and his younger brother held at gunpoint while driving to Thanksgiving](#Brian_Hofer_Thanksgiving_incident) | Vehicle wrongly flagged as stolen |
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| Aurora, Colorado | 2020 | [Mother and family including a 6-year-old ordered face down on hot pavement at gunpoint, $1.9 million settlement](#Aurora,_Colorado_family_detained_on_hot_pavement) | Database match error, a Colorado car matched to a Montana motorcycle |
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| Kechi, Kansas | 2022 | [Police lieutenant arrested for stalking after using Flock to follow his estranged wife](#Law_enforcement_misuse_and_stalking_incidents) | Officer misuse |
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| Reno, Nevada | 2023 | [UPS driver Jason Killinger arrested at a casino and detained about 11 hours](#Peppermill_Casino_facial_recognition_wrongful_arrest) | Facial recognition false match |
|
||||
| Las Vegas, Nevada | 2023 | [Metropolitan Police officer arrested for stalking his ex-fiancée](#Law_enforcement_misuse_and_stalking_incidents) | Officer misuse of police databases |
|
||||
| Sedgwick, Kansas | 2024 | [Police chief admitted 164 lookups of his ex-girlfriend and her new partner, then resigned](#Law_enforcement_misuse_and_stalking_incidents) | Officer misuse |
|
||||
| Colwich, Kansas | Reported 2024 | [Couple stopped twice on a stolen-pickup alert, the second time by officers with drawn guns](#Colwich,_Kansas:_duplicate_plate_numbers_across_plate_designs) | Database entry error, wrong plate type on a duplicated number |
|
||||
| Baltimore County, Maryland | 2025 | [Student handcuffed and searched after officers arrived with guns drawn while he ate chips outside school](#Baltimore_County_gun_detection_false_alarm) | AI gun-detection false positive |
|
||||
| Menasha, Wisconsin | 2026 | [Officer charged with misconduct after trying five times to search his ex-girlfriend's vehicle](#Law_enforcement_misuse_and_stalking_incidents) | Officer misuse |
|
||||
| Bow Mar and Columbine Valley, Colorado | 2025 | [Denver woman summonsed for a $25 package theft on the strength of camera logs, summons voided after she assembled her own alibi](#Columbine_Valley,_Colorado:_sergeant_refused_to_examine_exculpatory_dashcam_footage) | Correct read treated as proof of a crime |
|
||||
| Evergreen, Colorado | 2025 | [Driver's Subaru blocked in a parking lot by Jefferson County deputies](#Superior_and_Evergreen,_Colorado:_two_more_drivers_wrongly_listed) | Database entry error, a numeral 1 typed for the letter I in 2023 |
|
||||
| Superior, Colorado | 2025 | [76-year-old driver stopped by Boulder County deputies as a stolen-vehicle match](#Superior_and_Evergreen,_Colorado:_two_more_drivers_wrongly_listed) | Database entry error, both versions of her plate entered |
|
||||
| Española, New Mexico | Reported 2025 | [12-year-old handcuffed, and a 17-year-old honors student held at gunpoint a month later](#Española,_New_Mexico_child_detentions) | Plate misread |
|
||||
| Cherry Hills Village, Colorado | 2026 | [Kyle Dausman pulled over twice on a warrant alert that was not his](#Cherry_Hills_Village,_Colorado:_repeat_stops_from_hotlist_data_entry_error) | Database entry error, court clerk entered the wrong plate |
|
||||
|
||||
## False positives and system failures
|
||||
|
||||
Automated surveillance systems generate false positives in which innocent individuals are subjected to armed police responses based on system errors.
|
||||
|
||||
### Baltimore County gun detection false alarm
|
||||
|
||||
In October 2025, an AI-powered gun detection system at Kenwood High School in Baltimore County misidentified a student's snack food as a firearm, triggering an armed police response. Taki Allen was sitting outside the school with friends eating Doritos when officers with drawn weapons approached him.
|
||||
|
||||
> *They made me get on my knees, put my hands behind my back, and cuffed me* [^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Allen was forced to his knees, handcuffed, and searched before officers realized he was unarmed. Allen described watching about eight police cars arrive, with officers pointing guns at him.
|
||||
|
||||
> *The first thing I was wondering was, was I about to die? Because they had a gun pointed at me.*[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
When shown the image that triggered the alert, Allen explained:
|
||||
|
||||
> *I was just holding a Doritos bag, it was two hands and one finger out, and they said it looked like a gun.*[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
High schools in Baltimore County have used the AI gun detection system since 2023, using existing school cameras to scan for potential weapons. The system is operated by [Omnilert](https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=Omnilert&action=edit&redlink=1 "Omnilert (page does not exist)"), which uses existing school cameras to scan for potential weapons. The principal said the school district's security department reviewed & canceled the gun detection alert after confirming there was no weapon. A school official acknowledged "how upsetting this was for the individual that was searched as well as the other students who witnessed the incident." [^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Baltimore County Councilman Izzy Patoka called for a review of the system, stating: *No child in our school system should be accosted by police for eating a bag of Doritos.*[^5] Omnilert defended its system, claiming it *functioned as intended: to prioritize safety and awareness through rapid human verification,* though the incident demonstrated the system escalated to armed police response before adequate human review occurred.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Wrongful stops and detentions from ALPR alerts
|
||||
|
||||
ALPR systems generate false alerts that result in innocent individuals being held at gunpoint during high-risk traffic stops.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Brian Hofer Thanksgiving incident
|
||||
|
||||
In 2018, privacy advocate Brian Hofer and his younger brother were driving to visit their parents for Thanksgiving when they were held at gunpoint by law enforcement officers. Hofer's vehicle had been incorrectly flagged as stolen by an ALPR system, triggering an armed police response.
|
||||
|
||||
> *Your life definitely is different after you have guns pointed at you.*[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Hofer, now executive director of Secure Justice, an organization that aims to reduce government and corporate overreach, advocates for manual verification of ALPR "hits" before armed responses. He notes that even with verification procedures, data errors in databases can cause plates to match incorrect entries.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
CBS News verified over a dozen similar cases during a six-month investigation into incidents of wrongful stops and ALPR technology abuse, finding that consequences range from erroneous toll charges to armed detentions of innocent people.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Española, New Mexico child detentions
|
||||
|
||||
In Española, New Mexico, ALPR misreads resulted in two separate armed detentions of minors within one month. In one incident, a 12-year-old was handcuffed after an ALPR camera misread the last digit of a license plate on a vehicle driven by her older sister, interpreting a "2" as a "7," according to a lawsuit filed against the city.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
One month later in a separate incident, a 17-year-old honors student was held at gunpoint on his way home from school after officers mistook his vehicle for one associated with an individual sought in connection with a string of armed robberies.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Aurora, Colorado family detained on hot pavement
|
||||
|
||||
In Aurora, Colorado in 2020, a mother and her family, including her 6-year-old daughter, were pulled over at gunpoint and forced to lie face down on hot pavement due to an ALPR error. Police mistakenly flagged their Colorado license plate as matching a completely different vehicle from a different state, a stolen motorcycle registered in Montana.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The incident, captured on video and widely condemned, led to a $1.9 million settlement from the city in 2024.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Cherry Hills Village, Colorado: repeat stops from hotlist data entry error
|
||||
|
||||
According to 9News reporter Spencer Soicher, Kyle Dausman, who was driving through Cherry Hills Village, was pulled over twice by the Cherry Hills Village Police Department after a [Flock Safety](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_Safety "Flock Safety") camera generated a wanted-person alert tied to a Colorado Crime Information Center hotlist entry. Dausman told 9News, *I continually get pulled over.* Cherry Hills Village Police Chief Jason Lyons attributed the underlying error to a Gilpin County court data-entry mistake, with Colorado license plates using both the letter "O" and the numeral "0".[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Lyons said the cameras themselves alerted as designed, telling 9News that *The Flock cameras did alert to his license plate being associated to a warrant.* The Colorado State Patrol told the station that a court clerk had provided the incorrect plate information to the Colorado Crime Information Center, which supplied the information used on the Flock hotlist, and that because Gilpin County issued the underlying failure-to-appear warrant, only Gilpin County can fix it.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
During the first stop, Dausman told 9News that officers "zipped out of nowhere and immediately got behind me with the lights flashing," and he described feeling his safety was at risk. He was released at the scene once officers determined he was not the wanted suspect. A few days later the same department stopped him again on the same alert before recognizing him and releasing him. Chief Lyons said the department then suppressed the alert in its local Flock system, but stated that the agency cannot remove the underlying entry from the wider hotlist. Dausman summarized the burden this left him with: *Once you're in the Flock system, it's on you to get out.*[^3] [^6]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Superior and Evergreen, Colorado: two more drivers wrongly listed
|
||||
|
||||
Two more Coloradans came forward after the Dausman story aired, and 9News reported both cases on April 30, 2026.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Sarah Judson, 76, who was driving to Superior to see her grandchildren at her daughter's house, was flagged in December 2025 as matching a stolen vehicle out of Colorado Springs, and two Boulder County Sheriff's Office deputies stopped her near a roundabout; about two weeks later a deputy waited behind her car in a restaurant parking lot. The Boulder County Sheriff's Office confirmed that Colorado Springs Police had entered two versions of her plate into the statewide stolen vehicle database, one with the letter "O" and one with the numeral "0", and that her plate matched one of them. After 9News contacted Colorado Springs Police, the department fixed the entry the same day. A department spokesperson said the mistake was *100% human error, on our part.*[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Katie Rothman's 2019 Subaru Forester was blocked in a parking lot by Jefferson County Sheriff's Office deputies on August 31, 2025 after a Flock alert tied to a stolen vehicle report from Aurora Police. Aurora Police confirmed that in 2023 her plate had been entered into the Colorado Crime Information Center database instead of the actual stolen vehicle's plate, a numeral "1" typed where the letter "I" belonged, and that the entry sat in the system for nearly two years. The department told 9News, *The license plate was similar and was entered into the system with a typographical error.* Rothman called Aurora Police herself in September 2025 and the entry was corrected the same day.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
By April 30, 2026, all three drivers had been removed from the hotlist. 9News reported that in each of the three cases the wrongful flag was placed into the statewide database by a law enforcement agency that either entered both versions of an ambiguous plate character or made a typographical error, that the fix came only after the driver or the newsroom pushed the originating agency directly, and that no internal process caught the error.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Columbine Valley, Colorado: sergeant refused to examine exculpatory dashcam footage
|
||||
|
||||
On September 27, 2025, Columbine Valley Police Sergeant Jamie Milliman went to the Denver home of Chrisanna Elser to serve a court summons accusing her of stealing a package valued at $25 or less from a porch in neighboring Bow Mar on September 22, 2025. Milliman cited Bow Mar's [Flock Safety](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_Safety "Flock Safety") ALPR network, which had logged Elser's green Rivian truck passing through the town between 11:52 a.m. and 12:09 p.m. on the day of the theft.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
Ring doorbell footage of the encounter, reviewed by The Colorado Sun, recorded Milliman refusing to view Elser's Rivian dashboard camera footage, which she offered as proof that her vehicle never stopped in Bow Mar. Milliman told her, "If you are going to deny it to me, I am not going to help you with any courtesy." [^7] [^8]
|
||||
|
||||
Elser then assembled a digital alibi using her Rivian's onboard cameras, the vehicle's GPS log, and surveillance footage from a tailor shop she was visiting at the time of the theft. She located the actual theft video on NextDoor, which showed a different person who never entered a truck. After she submitted the evidence, the summons was voided.[^7] [^8]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 11, 2025, Columbine Valley Town Administrator J.D. McCrumb told Denverite that "appropriate disciplinary action will be applied to the officer involved" after the department's review of the encounter. Elser said the department never issued her a formal apology.[^9] Elser later testified before the Colorado General Assembly in support of Senate Bill 70, which would require a warrant for police access to historical ALPR data.[^10] On April 30, 2026, 9News reported that an effort to require a warrant to search a location tracking database like Flock had *failed in the Colorado legislature this week.*[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Colwich, Kansas: duplicate plate numbers across plate designs
|
||||
|
||||
Matthew and Leah Spurlock's minivan carried a University of Kansas alumni plate numbered 7007. A stolen GMC pickup carried a temporary tag reading Kansas 7007, the same number on a different plate background. KAKE reported that the problem for Kansas drivers is that *the state duplicates numbers* across its plate designs, so one alphanumeric combination can appear on more than one plate.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
Colwich police and a Sedgwick County sheriff's car made the first stop, and Colwich police said the wrong plate type had been entered into the system. About a month later officers stopped the couple again outside a casino in Catoosa, Oklahoma. KAKE wrote that the Spurlocks described *a pullover like none other in their lives with officers pointing drawn guns at them.*[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
Wichita Police Captain Casey Slaughter told KAKE that the reader cannot distinguish one plate design from another, saying of a disabled tag and a veteran's tag that *it doesn't know the difference between those two.* On what an alert is worth on its own, Slaughter said:
|
||||
|
||||
> *We can stop a car with reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Flock is more like the hunch.*[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
Once a plate has been listed as stolen, he said, *There's really no other recourse, at this point, for anybody.*[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Facial recognition false identification
|
||||
|
||||
#### Peppermill Casino facial recognition wrongful arrest
|
||||
|
||||
On September 17, 2023, Jason Killinger, a long-haul UPS truck driver, was wrongfully arrested at the Peppermill Casino in Reno, Nevada. Killinger entered the Peppermill Casino during a work trip. Casino security detained him based on a facial recognition alert identifying him as Michael Ellis, who had been issued a six-month trespass ban in March 2023 for sleeping on the premises.[^12] [^13] Ellis's ban was set to expire on September 26, 2023, nine days after the arrest.[^12] The AI system reportedly indicated a "100% match" in spite of large physical differences between the two men.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
Killinger showed the casino several forms of identification to prove his identity. This included his Nevada driver's license, a UPS payslip from his employer, and his vehicle registration.[^12] All of these documents matched his true identity. According to his subsequent lawsuit, Killinger protested that he was not Ellis, but casino security did not believe him and called the police.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
Released police records and driver's license images showed the two men differed in height by four inches and had different eye colors (blue vs. hazel), differences the facial recognition system failed to account for:[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
| Characteristic | Jason Killinger | Michael Ellis |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Height | Four inches taller than Ellis [^15] | |
|
||||
| Eye color | Blue | Hazel |
|
||||
|
||||
In his police report, Officer Richard Jager dismissed the eye color discrepancy, writing that blue and hazel eyes are *by their very nature similar eye colors and are dependent upon lighting.*[^12] The report also noted that Ellis had larger ears than Killinger.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
Officer Jager arrived at the casino. According to Killinger's lawsuit, he rejected the valid ID documents. Killinger alleges in court filings that Jager accused him of having *a DMV hook-up* to fabricate the documents.[^12] In his police report, Jager wrote that Killinger had *conflicting identification* and that *he lacked satisfactory evidence to reasonably assure me that he was who he claimed to be,* despite all identification documents matching the name Jason Killinger.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
Bodycam footage released in late 2025 captured Jager stating:
|
||||
|
||||
> "I have a feeling he's somehow making some fake identification or something." [^16]
|
||||
|
||||
Jager handcuffed Killinger and transported him to the police station. Killinger was detained for about 11 hours before fingerprint analysis proved he was not Michael Ellis.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
Killinger has since settled a claim with the Peppermill Casino for an undisclosed amount.[^17] His federal lawsuit against Officer Jager, *Killinger v. Jager*, Case No. 3:25-cv-00388-MMD-CSD, remains active in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
In a deposition reported in January 2026, Officer Jager acknowledged that the arrest *never should have happened* and stated that post-lawsuit training had clarified that facial recognition technology cannot serve as the sole basis for probable cause, but should instead be treated as *an investigative lead only* requiring further corroboration.[^15] Following the deposition, Killinger's attorney moved to add the City of Reno as a defendant, arguing that Jager's testimony demonstrated systemic failure to train officers on the limitations of AI facial recognition technology.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
The lawsuit alleges that Jager's actions violated Killinger's [Fourteenth Amendment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution "wikipedia:Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution") right to due process.[^12] Killinger alleges that Jager failed to use the police department's own fingerprint technology in a timely manner and omitted the fingerprint exoneration from his official report.[^12] He is seeking compensatory, special, and punitive damages; the lawsuit does not specify the amounts sought.[^12] Discovery in the case has been extended to July 2026, with motions due by August 2026.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
### Common ALPR error mechanisms
|
||||
|
||||
These incidents illustrate how ALPR systems generate misidentifications through multiple mechanisms:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Plate misreads**: OCR (optical character recognition) errors confuse similar characters (O/0, I/1, B/8, 2/7), causing the system to flag vehicles that match stolen vehicle databases or warrant lists.
|
||||
- **Cross-state confusion**: Systems incorrectly match vehicles from different states or confuse vehicle types (such as matching car plates to motorcycle registrations).
|
||||
- **Cloned plates**: Criminals using stolen or duplicated license plates create false associations between innocent vehicles and criminal activity.
|
||||
- **Stale data**: Vehicles recovered from theft or resolved warrant cases remain in hot lists, triggering alerts on lawful owners.
|
||||
|
||||
## Law enforcement misuse and stalking incidents
|
||||
|
||||
Documented cases show that law enforcement officers have misused ALPR systems, including Flock Safety cameras, to track individuals for personal, non-investigative purposes such as stalking romantic partners or civilians. These incidents have raised concerns about lack of internal oversight, auditing practices, and the concentration of surveillance power in individual user accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
In Menasha, Wisconsin, police officer Cristian Morales was charged in January 2026 with misconduct in office after prosecutors alleged he used the department's Flock ALPR system to track his ex-girlfriend. According to the criminal complaint, Morales tried to use the system five different times to search for his ex-partner's vehicle in October 2025. Court filings state that Morales acknowledged knowing the searches were improper and attributed them to *desperation* & a lack of judgment. He was placed on administrative leave, barred from accessing Flock systems, and released on a $10,000 cash bond pending further proceedings. A parallel civil filing seeking a temporary restraining order in a domestic abuse case was also lodged against Morales.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The Menasha case is one in what has become a national pattern. In Kansas, Kechi Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested in October 2022 on charges of stalking and unlawful acts concerning computers after using Flock cameras to monitor his estranged wife's movements.[^20] In a separate Kansas case, Sedgwick Police Chief Lee Nygaard admitted in 2024 to using Flock ALPR data 164 times to track his ex-girlfriend and her new partner, leading to his resignation and surrender of his law enforcement certification.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police officer Christopher Young was arrested in December 2023 for stalking his ex-fiancée using police databases.[^22] Investigations by the Associated Press and others have found that such misuse often remains undetected until a victim files a complaint or an external audit occurs.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
CNN reported in July 2026 that Milwaukee officer Josue Ayala was found by internal affairs detectives to have *secretly used Flock to learn the location of his romantic partner 124 times and that partner's ex 55 times, according to a February criminal complaint*.[^24] The detective who investigated him, Tehrangi Chapman, was later charged with felony misconduct in public office & misdemeanor misuse of a GPS device, after admitting to using Flock to track two people & to installing a GPS device on one person's vehicle.[^24] CNN reported that officers using Flock *had to write a brief explanation of the reason for conducting a search, but these explanations were vague*, & that Ayala gave his reason as *investigation* while Chapman listed *training* & *test*.[^24] CNN reported the incidents sit among *at least two dozen cases in which officers resigned or were arrested for allegedly abusing Flock's automated license-plate reader system to stalk romantic interests, according to a tally from the Institute for Justice*.[^24] Flock chief executive Garrett Langley told CNN, *This is such a powerful tool, we don't want to reduce the efficacy of the 99.99% of officers who go to work every single day and want to do good for their community.*[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
Atlanta News First reported in July 2026 that it *identified at least 20 cases in Georgia in the past year in which officers faced discipline and/or criminal allegations tied to improper use of the Flock system*.[^25] One of them was Paige Forte, a supervisor at the Conyers Police Department real-time crime center, whom the Georgia Bureau of Investigation alleged had accessed the system *for non-law enforcement purposes* more than thirty times between April & July 2026.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
Flock has pointed to those same audit logs as the mechanism that catches misuse. Company spokesperson Paris Lewbel told Atlanta News First that *Flock's audit tools have proven effective at enabling accountability, in many of the rare documented cases of misuse of our platform, it was our own audit logs that surfaced the issue*.[^25] The same reporting found that the logs had become less informative: *Atlanta News First Investigates found that Flock has removed officer names from audit logs where outside agencies search a department's data, replacing the officer names with anonymized Flock ID numbers.*[^25] Lewbel attributed the change to activists using publicly released audit data to identify undercover officers, saying nearly 200 law enforcement leaders had raised the concern.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
Two Kansas prosecutions are documented by case number in a petition filed in Sedgwick County. Former Kechi police lieutenant Victor Heiar was found guilty of unlawful use of computers & stalking in *State v. Heiar*, Case No. 2022-CR-001620.[^27] The Kansas Reflector reported he was sentenced to eighteen months on probation.[^28] Former Bonner Springs detective Kyle Rector was charged with eighteen counts including stalking, unlawful use of computers, breach of privacy & official misconduct, in *State v. Rector*, Case No. WY-2026-CR-000309.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
Researchers and civil liberties organizations have documented audit findings and policy gaps in agency oversight of ALPR access. While vendors and agencies rely on access logs and written policies, audits have found that these safeguards have not consistently prevented or detected misuse.[^29] [^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The Virginia State Crime Commission's 2025 survey found that despite statutory restrictions on sharing, twenty Virginia law enforcement agencies were still providing continuous access to out-of-state agencies and nine were providing continuous access to federal agencies. Town police departments and primary sheriff's offices accounted for the majority of non-compliant sharing.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Here, a prominent tech YouTuber claims that the 1st Amendment means no privacy in public spaces.
|
||||
|
||||
A common objection to constitutional challenges of automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems is the argument that individuals have *no expectation of privacy when in a public place.* The [Supreme Court of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States "wikipedia:Supreme Court of the United States") has instead applied a reasonable expectation of privacy standard under the [Fourth Amendment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution "wikipedia:Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution"), set out in the decisions quoted below.
|
||||
|
||||
### The "reasonable" standard in Fourth Amendment law
|
||||
|
||||
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures," not all searches. The constitutional analysis turns on whether surveillance violates a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy." This considers the nature, scope, and how intrusive the government monitoring is.
|
||||
|
||||
In [*Carpenter v. United States* *(2018)*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carpenter_v._United_States "wikipedia:Carpenter v. United States"), the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that venturing into public eliminates Fourth Amendment protection. Chief Justice [John Roberts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Roberts "wikipedia:John Roberts") wrote that the government's access to 127 days of cell-site location data, tracking movements on public roads, achieved *near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone's user.*[^32] The Court said,
|
||||
|
||||
> *A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.*[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### Distinction between isolated observation and citywide surveillance systems
|
||||
|
||||
Opinions in the cases below draw a line between isolated police observation & large-scale automated tracking. In *[United States v. Jones (2012)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Jones_\(2012\) "wikipedia:United States v. Jones (2012)")*, Justice [Sonia Sotomayor's](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonia_Sotomayor "wikipedia:Sonia Sotomayor") influential concurrence explained that [GPS tracking](https://consumerrights.wiki/index.php?title=GPS_tracking&action=edit&redlink=1 "GPS tracking (page does not exist)"):
|
||||
|
||||
> *generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.*[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
She noted that automated surveillance:
|
||||
|
||||
> *evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and community hostility.*[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The [Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massachusetts_Supreme_Judicial_Court "wikipedia:Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court") applied this reasoning to ALPR technology in *Commonwealth v. McCarthy (2020)*, holding:
|
||||
|
||||
> *With enough cameras in enough locations, the historic location data from an ALPR system in Massachusetts would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and would constitute a search for constitutional purposes.*[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
The court distinguished limited camera deployment from citywide networks, noting that widespread ALPR use would bring into question constitutional protections even though individual license plate observations would not.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mosaic theory
|
||||
|
||||
Commentators use the term [mosaic theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mosaic_theory_of_the_Fourth_Amendment "wikipedia:Mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment") for the idea that aggregating many individually innocuous observations can amount to a search. Justice [Samuel Alito](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Alito "wikipedia:Samuel Alito") noted in his *Jones* concurrence that:
|
||||
|
||||
> *society's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not; and indeed, in the main, simply could not; secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very long period.*[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
In [*United States v. Knotts (1983)*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Knotts "wikipedia:United States v. Knotts"), while holding that limited beeper (a radio-emitting surveillance device) tracking did not constitute a search, the Supreme Court wrote that if such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
### Litigation on citywide ALPR networks
|
||||
|
||||
Privacy advocates Lee Schmidt and Crystal Arrington challenged Norfolk's 176-camera Flock Safety ALPR network as unconstitutional. Federal judge [Mark S. Davis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Steven_Davis "wikipedia:Mark Steven Davis") initially denied a motion to dismiss the case in February 2025, finding that plaintiffs had stated a plausible Fourth Amendment claim. During discovery, it emerged that Schmidt's location was logged 526 times and Arrington's was logged 849 times between February and July 2025.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
However, on January 27, 2026, Judge Davis granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ruling that Norfolk's ALPR system did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In a 51-page opinion, Davis concluded that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the system was capable of tracking the entirety of a person's movements. The court found that although the cameras captured snapshots of daily life, they did not continuously track individuals or capture sufficient data to reconstruct whole routines, noting "sizable gaps" between photographs.[^37] [^38]
|
||||
|
||||
Notably, Judge Davis cautioned that the constitutional analysis could change as ALPR technology expands. He wrote that *ALPR surveillance could become too intrusive and run afoul of \[constitutional privacy standards\] at some point,* but concluded that *at least in Norfolk, Virginia, the answer is: not today.*[^37] The plaintiffs, represented by the Institute for Justice, announced their intention to appeal, with Schmidt stating he remained committed to fighting against what he described as "dragnet warrantless surveillance." [^37] [^38]
|
||||
|
||||
Flock Safety's chief legal officer responded that the decision aligned with rulings by over 30 state and federal courts concluding that fixed-location ALPRs do not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
Legal scholars note that U.S. law enforcement scanned 2.5 billion license plates between 2016 and 2017, with 99.5% belonging to vehicles unassociated with criminal activity,[^39] illustrating the dragnet nature of modern ALPR deployment that distinguishes it from traditional targeted surveillance methods.
|
||||
|
||||
### Scale and the reasonableness analysis
|
||||
|
||||
Real-world deployments show the scale: Denver operates 111 cameras scanning approximately 2 million license plates monthly;[^40] Norfolk's 176 cameras provide citywide coverage;[^36] and Austin's system scanned approximately 75 million plates from March through December 2024.[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
## "It only reads license plates, not people"
|
||||
|
||||
A frequent defense of [ALPR](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_license_plate_readers "Flock license plate readers") deployments is that the cameras photograph license plates, which are public and registered to vehicles rather than to people, so the systems track cars and not individuals.
|
||||
|
||||
Automatic license plate reader vendors have begun marketing sensors that tie the wireless devices a person carries to the vehicle's plate. Leonardo's [ELSAG SignalTrace](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Leonardo_ELSAG_SignalTrace "Leonardo ELSAG SignalTrace"), a sensor add-on patented in 2024 and marketed from 2025, captures the identifiers that phones, earbuds, smartwatches, and other devices broadcast and correlates the devices that repeatedly travel with a vehicle into an *"electronic fingerprint"* tied to its plate.[^42] Reporting on the product for 404 Media, Joseph Cox wrote that it:
|
||||
|
||||
> *would turn ALPR cameras from devices focused on tracking cars to ones that can more readily track the location of particular people.*
|
||||
|
||||
[^43]
|
||||
|
||||
Leonardo's own announcement framed the capability the same way. Jason Laquatra, general manager of Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions, said:
|
||||
|
||||
> *The future of LPR advancements is reliant on enhancing LPR data sets with additional information from various electronic devices to find the individuals police are looking for.*
|
||||
|
||||
[^44] The company says the system reads only publicly broadcast signals and *"does not decrypt or capture the contents of the devices or their communications."* [^44] SignalTrace is made by Leonardo, not [Flock](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_Safety "Flock Safety"). The June 2026 reporting described it as a capability cameras would soon carry rather than one any agency had yet deployed.[^43] [^45]
|
||||
|
||||
## "Cameras reduce crime"
|
||||
|
||||
A common argument for ALPR deployments is that the cameras reduce or deter crime, a rationale officials invoke to justify keeping them in service. Denver Mayor Mike Johnston extended the city's [Flock Safety](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_Safety "Flock Safety") contract a second time in October 2025 through an administrative move that bypassed a City Council vote, an extension the city characterized as no-cost and running through March 31, 2026.[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
Denver's city-run network went dark soon afterward. The Flock contract expired on March 31, 2026, and on a 7-6 vote that day the City Council approved a $150,000 yearlong contract with Axon to replace it; Council President Amanda Sandoval voted in favor.[^47] The city decommissioned and removed all 110 Flock license plate reader cameras.[^48] The 50 Axon cameras were to be installed over the following weeks, so the city-run ALPR network was dark during that gap, though private Flock cameras stayed in operation across Denver.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Denverite reported that the Denver City Council approved a $150,000 yearlong Axon license plate camera contract on a 7-6 vote, replacing the city's former Flock system. 47
|
||||
|
||||
Denver Open Data's police crime feature service shows motor vehicle theft in the city falling from about 430 in April 2025 to about 301 in April 2026, roughly a 30% decrease, during the month the city's network was offline (Denver Open Data, pulled June 14, 2026).[^49] 9NEWS, which obtained the data through a public-records request, reported 439 vehicles stolen in April 2025 (cameras on) versus 313 in April 2026 (cameras off), a 29% decrease, and a drop in auto-theft cases cleared by arrest from 13% to 3%.[^50]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The Denver Open Data police crime dataset, drawn from Denver Police NIBRS records, is the source queried for the April 2025 and April 2026 motor vehicle theft counts. 49
|
||||
|
||||
The comparison is not conclusive on its own. The clearance figures move the other way, and the Denver figures cover a single month. The Colorado Auto Theft Prevention Authority's Cale Gould attributed the statewide auto-theft decline to a combination of factors rather than cameras alone, telling the Denver Gazette, *It wasn't one thing that changed, but collectively everything.* The same reporting credited 2023 changes to Colorado law, including Senate Bill 23-097, which made motor vehicle theft a felony regardless of the vehicle's value.[^51] [^52]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The Colorado Auto Theft Prevention Authority's Cale Gould told the Denver Gazette that the statewide car theft decline came from a combination of factors, It wasn't one thing that changed, but collectively everything. 51
|
||||
|
||||
Virginia became one of the first states to enact statewide ALPR regulation when legislation establishing statewide standards for law enforcement use of ALPR took effect on July 1, 2025. Before this date, Virginia had no statewide statutory or regulatory framework governing law enforcement use of ALPR, meaning agencies could operate the technology without any statewide limitations on use, data retention, or data sharing.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview of Virginia's 2025 ALPR law
|
||||
|
||||
Under the new statute (Virginia House Bill 2724, codified at Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-5517), law enforcement agencies in Virginia may only use ALPR for criminal investigations, active investigations into missing or endangered persons or human trafficking, and notifications related to missing or endangered persons, outstanding warrants, human trafficking, stolen vehicles, or stolen license plates.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
The law requires ALPR data to be purged after 21 days unless needed for an ongoing investigation, prosecution, or civil action. It also restricts data sharing to other Virginia law enforcement agencies, Commonwealth's Attorneys, criminal defendants or their counsel, ALPR vendors, or pursuant to a court order. The statute does not permit data sharing with out-of-state or federal law enforcement agencies.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### Compliance findings from the Virginia State Crime Commission
|
||||
|
||||
In January 2026, the Virginia State Crime Commission published the findings of a statewide survey of all 361 Virginia law enforcement agencies on their use of ALPR. The survey, conducted in November 2025 to capture practices after the new legislation took effect, received responses from 251 agencies (70%). Of responding agencies, 63% (159 of 251) reported using ALPR. A large majority, 86% (137 of 159), reported [Flock Safety](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_Safety "Flock Safety") as their ALPR vendor.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
The Crime Commission found that some agencies were not complying with the new statutory requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Data retention violations**: 21% (33 of 159) of agencies using ALPR reported retaining data beyond the statutory 21-day limit. Reported retention periods for fixed cameras ranged from 22 to 60 days; for mobile cameras, 30 to 180 days.[^31]
|
||||
- **Unauthorized data sharing with federal and out-of-state agencies**: Despite the statute prohibiting such sharing, 13% (20 of 159) of agencies reported providing continuous access to out-of-state law enforcement agencies, and 6% (9 of 159) reported providing continuous access to federal law enforcement agencies.[^31]
|
||||
- **No written ALPR policy**: 16% (26 of 159) of agencies using ALPR reported having no policy on ALPR use, despite the statutory requirement to maintain one. An additional 9% (14 of 159) reported being in the process of implementing a policy.[^31]
|
||||
- **No public awareness measures**: 35% (55 of 159) of agencies reported taking no public awareness measures regarding their ALPR use, despite statutory requirements to promote public awareness.[^31]
|
||||
- **Non-response**: Almost one-third of law enforcement agencies did not respond to the survey at all, meaning their ALPR use and compliance status remain unknown.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
The Crime Commission's report stated that the Chair, Delegate Charniele Herring, planned to send letters to agencies whose survey responses indicated non-compliance with the new law, as well as to non-responding agencies.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### Data sharing concerns
|
||||
|
||||
Virginia's experience reflects a national pattern of concerns over ALPR data sharing. A September 2025 investigation by the Virginia Center for Investigative Journalism found that before the new law took effect, federal agencies had attempted to access local Virginia ALPR data thousands of times for immigration enforcement purposes, and one small town's Flock network data had been searched nearly 7 million times by outside agencies in a single year.[^53] At least two Virginia localities, Charlottesville and Staunton, subsequently ended their use of Flock Safety cameras, citing concerns about federal data sharing.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
As of early 2026, at least 30 localities across the United States have either deactivated Flock cameras or canceled their contracts, driven in part by concerns over privacy and federal agency access to locally collected ALPR data.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
## Revolving door: surveillance vendor hiring of public officials
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple documented cases have raised concerns about [Flock Safety](https://consumerrights.wiki/w/Flock_Safety "Flock Safety") 's practice of hiring current or recently departed public officials who hold or held influence over the procurement of the company's products.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cleveland, Ohio: former council majority leader joins Flock
|
||||
|
||||
Kerry McCormack, the Ward 3 council member and Majority Leader of the Cleveland City Council, announced his resignation on September 11, 2025. He left office in early October 2025. He joined Flock Safety immediately afterward as public affairs lead for the eastern United States. No reporting has identified a gap between his departure from office and his start date at Flock.[^55] [^56]
|
||||
|
||||
In late October 2025, the Bibb administration introduced Ordinance 1367-2025 to Cleveland City Council: an emergency ordinance authorizing a contract with Flock Group, Inc. dba Flock Safety for a period up to three years.[^57]
|
||||
|
||||
The administration justified the sole-source designation on two grounds: that Flock was the only vendor offering the specific integrated bundle of services, and that the contract piggybacked on a pre-negotiated Ohio state term purchasing agreement. At the November 14, 2025 Safety Committee hearing, ShotSpotter representatives attended and stated on the record that they offer competing products capable of fulfilling the same requirements & wanted an opportunity to bid.[^58] [^59]
|
||||
|
||||
#### How the emergency and bidding bypass works
|
||||
|
||||
Cleveland Charter § 36 defines an emergency measure as an ordinance or resolution for the "immediate preservation of the public peace, property, health, or safety" or for the "usual daily operation of a Municipal department." Combined with the § 33 rule suspension mechanism, an emergency designation bypasses the normal three-reading requirement and the 30-day waiting period before a measure takes effect. Emergency passage requires a two-thirds supermajority of all elected council members.[^60]
|
||||
|
||||
Charter § 108 requires competitive bidding for contracts exceeding $50,000, with an exception for cooperative purchasing arrangements with other governmental agencies. Professional services contracts are exempt from sealed bidding but are still expected to go through a Request for Proposals process per the Division of Purchases and Supplies. The Bibb administration issued neither a formal bid nor an RFP for the Flock expansion.[^61] [^62]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Ohio revolving door law and its limitations
|
||||
|
||||
Ohio Revised Code § 102.03(A)(1) bars former public officials for twelve months from representing any person or entity before any public agency on any "matter" in which the official personally participated during their public service.[^63]
|
||||
|
||||
However, R.C. 102.03(A)(5) excludes from the definition of matter the proposal, consideration, or enactment of statutes, rules, ordinances, resolutions, or charter or constitutional amendments. Ordinance 1367-2025 was legislation requiring formal consideration by City Council, & the statute excludes legislative matters from the definition of matter that the twelve-month ban uses.[^63]
|
||||
|
||||
Cleveland has no local revolving-door ordinance, no lobbying registration requirement, and no cooling-off period of its own. Chapter 171 of the Cleveland Codified Ordinances covers employment provisions such as hours of work and overtime, not ethics or lobbying.[^64]
|
||||
|
||||
McCormack told Signal Cleveland that he "did not seek an opinion from the Ohio Ethics Commission" and was voluntarily observing the one-year rule as a best practice. However, News 5 Cleveland's investigators obtained McCormack's emails through a public records request and reported that he did contact the Ohio Ethics Commission about restrictions approximately one month before leaving office.[^65] [^66]
|
||||
|
||||
McCormack's one-year recusal from Cleveland matters is voluntary and self-enforced. It is not a Flock corporate policy. McCormack stated: *Whether I have a defined legal conflict or not, regardless, it's best practice I think to sit out \[for\] a year from engaging the city of Cleveland.*[^65]
|
||||
|
||||
Council member Rebecca Maurer stated at a Safety Committee hearing: "I hope you understand the hesitancy I have given a member of this body just departed to take a job at Flock that we now have a sole source contract without an RFP process." [^66]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Status of the Cleveland contract
|
||||
|
||||
Cleveland's ShotSpotter contract expires in April 2026 and the existing Flock automated license plate reader contract expires in June 2026. The Bibb administration proposed bundling both into a single expanded Flock contract covering cameras, license plate readers, gunshot detection, and audio monitoring, all through one vendor on a sole-source basis.[^67]
|
||||
|
||||
Council refused to advance the legislation. Fox 8 reported that council will not move forward until a full review is conducted and a request for proposals has been issued.
|
||||
|
||||
The Bibb administration then asked Safety Committee Chair Michael Polensek to shelve the expansion before year-end 2025. No public explanation was given. Polensek counter-proposed issuing a request for qualification.[^68]
|
||||
|
||||
As of March 2026, Ordinance 1367-2025 sits on indefinite hold in the Safety Committee. No vote has been scheduled, no RFP has been issued, and no RFQ has been completed. Approximately 100 Flock license plate reader cameras remain active across Cleveland.[^68] [^69]
|
||||
|
||||
A grassroots group called Flockno delivered a letter with 275 signatures to City Hall demanding the city cut ties with Flock entirely and remove existing cameras when the June contract expires. News 5 reported the petition had gathered nearly 300 signatures total. Organizer Bryn Adams stated: "We want to ask the city to remove, not renew." [^69] [^68]
|
||||
|
||||
### Moreno Valley, California: Flock hired a sitting mayor
|
||||
|
||||
In February 2024, Flock Safety hired Ulises Cabrera, the sitting mayor of Moreno Valley, California (population 200,000+), as a Community Engagement Manager. A Flock job posting for the position listed a salary of $100,000 to $140,000 plus stock options. The role was intended to guide law enforcement customers through the public procurement process in collaboration with Flock's sales team. Cabrera had previously voted as mayor to fund a citywide Flock camera system in Moreno Valley.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
During his time at Flock, Cabrera gave presentations promoting the company's technology at city council meetings in at least two other jurisdictions: Whitewater, Kansas and Mammoth Lakes, California.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
#### Cabrera v. Flock Safety
|
||||
|
||||
In November 2024, Cabrera filed a wrongful termination lawsuit against Flock Safety.[^71] According to the complaint, approximately two weeks after Cabrera started working at Flock, an employee requested that he use his position as mayor of Moreno Valley to benefit the company. Cabrera alleges he refused, forwarded the request to his legal counsel while copying the Flock employee, and that the employee immediately began exhibiting retaliatory behavior. Flock terminated Cabrera in June 2024. He worked at Flock from February to June 2024.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
Cabrera also alleges he raised concerns that Flock was underreporting the number of surveillance cameras installed in Carmel-by-the-Sea. A separate Forbes investigation published in February 2024 found that Flock camera installations broke laws in at least five states, including by installing cameras without proper permits.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
Flock categorically denies all of Cabrera's allegations and says its hire of a sitting mayor complied with California conflict-of-interest regulations.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
#### California conflict-of-interest law
|
||||
|
||||
California Government Code § 1090 prohibits public officers from being financially interested in any contract made by the body or board of which they are members.[^72] The complaint in *Cabrera v. Flock Safety* describes a sitting mayor receiving a salary & stock options from the vendor during a period when his city council approved that vendor's contracts.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
While campaigning for reelection in November 2024, Cabrera's campaign website cited his earlier vote to fund Moreno Valley's Flock system, but did not disclose that he had subsequently worked for Flock while serving as mayor.[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
### Comparison of Cleveland and Moreno Valley ethics gaps
|
||||
|
||||
Albert Fox Cahn, founder of the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, stated that the allegations in the Moreno Valley case "add to the growing body of evidence that American surveillance is fueled by a broken revolving door between industry and government." [^70]
|
||||
|
||||
The Cleveland and Moreno Valley cases illustrate different but related gaps in ethics law. In Ohio, the state revolving-door statute excludes legislative matters from the cooling-off period.[^63] California Government Code § 1090 bars public officers from being financially interested in contracts made by the body they serve.[^72] Cleveland has no local lobbying registration or cooling-off ordinance.[^64] On the California statute, The Desert Sun reported that *the law bars public officials from making decisions based on their own financial interests, including as employees in private companies. But it doesn't prohibit them from taking private sector jobs.*[^70]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Fichten, Lauren; Clark, Alex (2025-07-24). ["When license plate readers get it wrong"](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/license-plate-readers-alpr-mistakes/). *CBS News*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20250724210641/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/license-plate-readers-alpr-mistakes/) from the original on 2025-07-24. Retrieved 2025-10-28.
|
||||
|
||||
[^2]: Kerhin, Brian (2026-01-09). ["Menasha police officer accused of using license plate recognition system to track his ex"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260110000858/https://fox11online.com/news/crime/menasha-police-officer-accused-of-using-license-plate-recognition-system-to-track-his-ex-girlfriend-cristian-morales-misconduct-in-office-flock-domestic-abuse-restraining-order-cash-bond). *FOX 11 News*. Archived from [the original](https://fox11online.com/news/crime/menasha-police-officer-accused-of-using-license-plate-recognition-system-to-track-his-ex-girlfriend-cristian-morales-misconduct-in-office-flock-domestic-abuse-restraining-order-cash-bond) on 2026-01-10. Retrieved 2026-01-11.
|
||||
|
||||
[^3]: Soicher, Spencer (2026-04-23). ["He didn't commit a crime, but Flock cam alerts keep getting him pulled over"](https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/rime-flock-cam-pulled-over/73-e3f65018-32a5-4bb0-a4ac-26fb24dc9a15). *9News (KUSA)*. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
|
||||
[^4]: Soicher, Spencer (2026-04-30). ["Not a one-off: More Coloradans stopped by police after data errors triggered Flock alerts"](https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/coloradan-stopped-by-police-data-errors-flock-alerts/73-593a3772-f43d-46b1-8744-af888b9bd7f2). *9News (KUSA)*. Retrieved 2026-08-10.
|
||||
|
||||
[^5]: Tsui, Karina; Sottile, Zoe (2025-10-25). ["Student handcuffed after Doritos bag mistaken for a gun by school's AI security system"](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/25/us/baltimore-student-chips-ai-gun-detection-hnk). *CNN*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20251026050806/https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/25/us/baltimore-student-chips-ai-gun-detection-hnk) from the original on 2025-10-26. Retrieved 2025-10-28.
|
||||
|
||||
[^6]: ["Flock cameras keep telling police a Colorado man who doesn't have a warrant has a warrant"](https://www.9news.com/video/news/local/flock-cameras-keep-telling-police-a-colorado-man-who-doesnt-have-a-warrant-has-a-warrant/73-3f3f3653-e8e2-4fb6-aa28-8a1f24f7f67c). *9News (KUSA)*. 2026-04-23. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
|
||||
[^7]: Paul, Jesse (2025-10-28). ["A suburban police officer used a Flock surveillance camera to accuse a Denver woman of theft. Then she had to prove him wrong"](https://coloradosun.com/2025/10/28/flock-camera-police-colorado-columbine-valley/). *The Colorado Sun*. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
|
||||
[^8]: ["Flock cameras lead Colorado police to wrong suspect"](https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/flock-cameras-lead-colorado-police-wrong-suspect/). *CBS News Colorado*. 2025-11-13. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
|
||||
[^9]: ["The cop who wrongfully accused a Denver woman of a package theft faces discipline"](https://denverite.com/2025/11/11/flock-package-theft-denver-surveillance-discipline/). *Denverite*. 2025-11-11. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
|
||||
[^10]: Soicher, Spencer (2026-02-23). ["Colorado bill requiring warrant to search license plate tracking database advances"](https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/local-politics/colorado-bill-requiring-warrant-to-search-license-plate-tracking-database-advances/73-1bd4369f-a168-407f-8079-488bb358f9ef). *9News (KUSA)*. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
|
||||
[^11]: Pedraza, Pilar (2024-01-30). ["KAKE NEWS INVESTIGATES: Duplicate license plate numbers lead to dangerous situations for some Kansas drivers"](https://www.kake.com/news/kake-news-investigates-duplicate-license-plate-numbers-lead-to-dangerous-situations-for-some-kansas-drivers/article_1e517042-6b10-53ad-8cea-7f4abfc430ed.html). *KAKE*. Retrieved 2026-08-10.
|
||||
|
||||
[^12]: Roarty, Adam (2025-12-09). ["Reno Police Report Shows How Casino's Facial Recognition Led to Wrongful Arrest"](https://web.archive.org/web/20251210222601/https://casinobeats.com/2025/12/09/reno-police-report-facial-recognition-wrongful-arrest/). *CasinoBeats*. Archived from [the original](https://casinobeats.com/2025/12/09/reno-police-report-facial-recognition-wrongful-arrest/) on 2025-12-10. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^13]: Conneller, Philip (2025-11-11). ["Peppermill Reno's Facial Recognition Tech Leads to Wrongful Arrest"](https://www.casino.org/news/peppermill-renos-facial-recognition-tech-leads-to-wrongful-arrest/). *Casino.org*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20260216033051/https://www.casino.org/news/peppermill-renos-facial-recognition-tech-leads-to-wrongful-arrest/) from the original on 2026-02-16. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^14]: García, Jerome (2025-12-11). ["Peppermill Casino AI Software Gives 100% Match, Misidentifies Passer-by"](https://web.archive.org/web/20251205215015/https://www.gamblingnews.com/news/peppermill-casino-ai-software-gives-100-match-misidentifies-passer-by/). *Gambling News*. Archived from [the original](https://www.gamblingnews.com/news/peppermill-casino-ai-software-gives-100-match-misidentifies-passer-by/) on 2025-12-05. Retrieved 2026-01-11.
|
||||
|
||||
[^15]: Conneller, Philip (2026-01-28). ["Reno Cop Concedes Peppermill Facial Recognition Arrest was Wrongful"](https://www.casino.org/news/reno-cop-concedes-peppermill-facial-recognition-arrest-wrongful/). *Casino.org*. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^16]: Gwilliam, Michael (2025-12-15). ["Bodycam footage reveals moment innocent man is arrested after AI misidentifies him"](https://web.archive.org/web/20251218224228/https://www.dexerto.com/entertainment/bodycam-footage-reveals-moment-innocent-man-is-arrested-after-ai-misidentifies-him-3294374/). *Dexerto*. Archived from [the original](https://www.dexerto.com/entertainment/bodycam-footage-reveals-moment-innocent-man-is-arrested-after-ai-misidentifies-him-3294374/) on 2025-12-18. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^17]: ["Victim of Black Mirror Scenario Settles with Peppermill and Goes After Local Reno Cop"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260110235640/http://www.ourtownreno.com/our-stories-1/2025/11/14/victim-of-black-mirror-scenario-settles-with-peppermill-and-goes-after-local-reno-cop). *Our Town Reno*. 2025-11-14. Archived from [the original](http://www.ourtownreno.com/our-stories-1/2025/11/14/victim-of-black-mirror-scenario-settles-with-peppermill-and-goes-after-local-reno-cop) on 2026-01-10. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^18]: ["KILLINGER v. JAGER"](http://web.archive.org/web/20260210093102/https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20250925d22). *Leagle*. Archived from [the original](https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20250925d22) on 2026-02-10. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^19]: ["Killinger vs Jager, Case Details"](https://unicourt.com/case/pc-db5-casegucf509a42dd1e-2175767). *UniCourt*. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^20]: Baker, Joe (2022-10-31). ["Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife"](https://web.archive.org/web/20221031042853/https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/). *KWCH*. Archived from [the original](https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/) on 2022-10-31.
|
||||
|
||||
[^21]: Stavola, Michael (2024-08-17). ["Kansas police chief used Flock license plate cameras to track ex-girlfriend"](https://web.archive.org/web/20240817105006/https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html). *Yahoo News*. Archived from [the original](https://www.yahoo.com/news/kansas-police-chief-used-flock-093300946.html) on 2024-08-17.
|
||||
|
||||
[^22]: McCandless, C.C. (2024-02-16). ["Las Vegas police officer arrested for reportedly stalking ex-fiancée"](https://web.archive.org/web/20240216010507/https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/). *FOX5 Vegas*. Archived from [the original](https://www.fox5vegas.com/2024/02/16/las-vegas-police-officer-arrested-reportedly-stalking-ex-fiancee/) on 2024-02-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^23]: Tucker, Eric (2016-09-27). ["When cops abuse confidential databases"](https://web.archive.org/web/20230721171815/https://apnews.com/general-news-699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43). *Associated Press*. Archived from [the original](https://apnews.com/general-news-699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43) on 2023-07-21.
|
||||
|
||||
[^24]: Eric Levenson (2026-07-26). ["Inside the growing police use and misuse of Flock's license-plate reader cameras"](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/26/us/flock-cameras-surveillance-abuse). CNN. Retrieved 2026-08-10.
|
||||
|
||||
[^25]: Brendan Keefe (2026-07-17). ["AI audit tool flags suspicious police searches as Flock misuse cases mount in Georgia"](https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/07/17/ai-audit-tool-flags-suspicious-police-searches-flock-misuse-cases-mount-georgia/). Atlanta News First. Retrieved 2026-08-10.
|
||||
|
||||
[^26]: ["Ga. police supervisor arrested after Flock audit, department says"](https://www.wrdw.com/2026/07/24/ga-police-supervisor-arrested-after-flock-audit-department-says/). WRDW. 2026-07-23. Retrieved 2026-08-10.
|
||||
|
||||
[^27]: ["Grimmett v. City of Wichita, Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Case No. SG-2026-CV-002760"](https://kansasjusticeinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/1-Petition.pdf) (PDF). *Kansas Justice Institute*. 2026-07-29. Retrieved 2026-08-12.
|
||||
|
||||
[^28]: Tim Carpenter (2026-07-31). ["Kansas lawsuit challenges Wichita law enforcement's reliance on license plate reader cameras"](https://kansasreflector.com/2026/07/31/kansas-lawsuit-challenges-wichita-law-enforcements-reliance-on-license-plate-reader-cameras/). Kansas Reflector. Retrieved 2026-08-10.
|
||||
|
||||
[^29]: ["Automated License Plate Readers widely used, subject to abuse"](https://web.archive.org/web/20230617100257/https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse). *University of Michigan*. 2023-02-22. Archived from [the original](https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/news/2023/automated-license-plate-readers-widely-used-subject-abuse) on 2023-06-17.
|
||||
|
||||
[^30]: Davidson, Nikki (2024-04-16). ["ALPR Audit Takeaways: What We Learned About Policy Gaps"](https://web.archive.org/web/20240417005310/https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps). *Government Technology*. Archived from [the original](https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/alpr-audit-takeaways-what-we-learned-about-policy-gaps) on 2024-04-17.
|
||||
|
||||
[^31]: ["Law Enforcement Use of Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Update, January 2026"](https://vscc.virginia.gov/2026/VSCC%20ALPR%20Report%20January%202026%20FINAL%20REVISED%20Jan%2021%202026.pdf) (PDF). Virginia State Crime Commission. 2026-01-01. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^32]: ["Carpenter v. United States"](https://web.archive.org/web/20180623061246/https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-402). *Legal Information Institute*. Cornell Law School. Archived from [the original](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-402) on 2018-06-23. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^33]: ["United States v. Jones"](https://web.archive.org/web/20120126022816/https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259). *Legal Information Institute*. Cornell Law School. Archived from [the original](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259) on 2012-01-26. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^34]: ["Commonwealth v. McCarthy"](https://web.archive.org/web/20220303203404/https://cases.justia.com/massachusetts/supreme-court/2020-sjc-12750.pdf) (PDF). *Justia*. 2020-04-16. Archived from [the original](https://cases.justia.com/massachusetts/supreme-court/2020-sjc-12750.pdf) (PDF) on 2022-03-03. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^35]: ["United States v. Knotts"](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/460/276). *Legal Information Institute*. Cornell Law School. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20120601022257/https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/460/276) from the original on 2012-06-01. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^36]: Collier, Kevin (2025-09-18). ["Police cameras tracked one driver 526 times in four months, lawsuit says"](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399). *NBC News*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20250918093450/https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/virginia-police-used-flock-cameras-track-driver-safety-lawsuit-surveil-rcna230399) from the original on 2025-09-18. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^37]: Cox, Toby (2026-02-11). ["A federal judge ruled Norfolk's Flock surveillance cameras don't invade people's privacy, yet"](https://www.whro.org/business-growth/2026-02-11/a-federal-judge-ruled-norfolks-flock-surveillance-cameras-dont-invade-peoples-privacy-yet). *WHRO*. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^38]: ["Judge holds Norfolk's license plate reader use constitutional"](https://courthousenews.com/judge-holds-norfolks-license-plate-reader-use-constitutional/). *Courthouse News Service*. 2026-01-28. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^39]: Maass, Dave; Lipton, Beryl (2021-04-22). ["Data Driven: Explore How Cops Are Collecting and Sharing Our Travel Patterns Using Automated License Plate Readers"](https://web.archive.org/web/20181115183012/https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-reader-dataset). *Electronic Frontier Foundation*. Archived from [the original](https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-reader-dataset) on 2018-11-15. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^40]: Kenney, Andrew (2024-09-19). ["2 million license plates scanned monthly by Denver's new police cameras"](https://web.archive.org/web/20240919214639/https://denverite.com/2024/09/19/denver-flock-license-plate-scanners-update/). *Denverite*. Archived from [the original](https://denverite.com/2024/09/19/denver-flock-license-plate-scanners-update/) on 2024-09-19. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^41]: Thompson, Ben (2025-05-20). ["75M license plates scanned under rebooted Austin police program; audit reveals successes, concerns"](https://communityimpact.com/austin/south-central-austin/government/2025/05/20/75m-license-plates-scanned-under-rebooted-austin-police-program-audit-reveals-successes-concerns/). *Community Impact*. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20250607131518/https://communityimpact.com/austin/south-central-austin/government/2025/05/20/75m-license-plates-scanned-under-rebooted-austin-police-program-audit-reveals-successes-concerns/) from the original on 2025-06-07. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
|
||||
|
||||
[^42]: Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions (2025-09-09). ["ELSAG SignalTrace product sheet"](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28215440-signaltrace-us/). *DocumentCloud*. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
|
||||
|
||||
[^43]: Cox, Joseph (2026-06-08). ["This Company Will Add Phone, AirPod, and Smartwatch Trackers to License Plate Readers"](https://www.404media.co/this-company-will-add-phone-airpod-and-smartwatch-trackers-to-license-plate-readers/). *404 Media*. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
|
||||
|
||||
[^44]: ["Leonardo US Cyber and Security Solutions receives a patent for their new electronic signature tracking system for law enforcement"](https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240530567391/en/Leonardo-US-Cyber-and-Security-Solutions-receives-a-patent-for-their-new-electronic-signature-tracking-system-for-law-enforcement). *Business Wire*. 2024-05-30. [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20250810050941/https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240530567391/en/Leonardo-US-Cyber-and-Security-Solutions-receives-a-patent-for-their-new-electronic-signature-tracking-system-for-law-enforcement) from the original on 2025-08-10. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
|
||||
|
||||
[^45]: Ismail, Adam (2026-06-17). ["License Plate Cameras Will Soon Track Phones, Wearables, Infotainment, and Even Your Pets"](https://www.thedrive.com/news/license-plate-cameras-will-soon-track-phones-wearables-infotainment-and-even-your-pets). *The Drive*. Retrieved 2026-06-21.
|
||||
|
||||
[^46]: Zialcita, Paolo; DeMare, Kiara (October 22, 2025). ["Mayor extends Flock camera contract in Denver"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260601220936/https://denverite.com/2025/10/22/mayor-extends-flock-camera-contract-denver/). *Denverite*. Archived from [the original](https://denverite.com/2025/10/22/mayor-extends-flock-camera-contract-denver/) on June 1, 2026. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^47]: Harris, Kyle (March 31, 2026). ["Denver will keep surveilling license plates, with a new company"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260402025512/https://denverite.com/2026/03/31/denver-license-plate-readers-axon-contract-city-council/). *Denverite*. Archived from [the original](https://denverite.com/2026/03/31/denver-license-plate-readers-axon-contract-city-council/) on April 2, 2026. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^48]: Prentzel, Olivia (April 21, 2026). ["Colorado Senate Bill 70 would limit surveillance technology"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200342/https://coloradosun.com/2026/04/21/senate-bill-70-colorado-surveillance-technology/). *The Colorado Sun*. Archived from [the original](https://coloradosun.com/2026/04/21/senate-bill-70-colorado-surveillance-technology/) on June 14, 2026. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^49]: ["Crime"](https://opendata-geospatialdenver.hub.arcgis.com/datasets/geospatialDenver::crime). *Denver Open Data*. City and County of Denver. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^50]: Soicher, Spencer (June 12, 2026). ["Denver's license plate cameras went dark for a month. Auto theft dropped 29% anyway"](https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/local-politics/denvers-license-plate-cameras-auto-theft-dropped/73-73295672-9b03-45c2-a4c0-a38355ed84bb). *9NEWS (KUSA)*. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^51]: Del Puerto, Luige (May 6, 2024). ["Colorado law cracking down on car theft credited for sharp decline"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200710/https://www.denvergazette.com/2024/05/06/colorado-law-cracking-down-on-car-theft-credited-for-sharp-decline-b244948e-0b35-11ef-b004-a314cf440531/). *Denver Gazette*. Archived from [the original](https://www.denvergazette.com/2024/05/06/colorado-law-cracking-down-on-car-theft-credited-for-sharp-decline-b244948e-0b35-11ef-b004-a314cf440531/) on June 14, 2026. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^52]: ["SB23-097: Motor Vehicle Theft / Unauthorized Use"](https://web.archive.org/web/20260614200854/https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb23-097). *Colorado General Assembly*. Archived from [the original](https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb23-097) on June 14, 2026. Retrieved June 14, 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[^53]: Falayi, K. (2025-09-16). ["One sleepy Virginia town. Nearly 7 million hits on its surveillance network"](https://vcij.org/stories/state-of-surveillance). *Virginia Center for Investigative Journalism*. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^54]: ["Why some cities are canceling Flock license plate reader contracts"](https://www.npr.org/2026/02/17/nx-s1-5612825/flock-contracts-canceled-immigration-survillance-concerns). *NPR*. 2026-02-19. Retrieved 2026-03-02.
|
||||
|
||||
[^55]: [Ideastream: Cleveland Councilmember Kerry McCormack resigns before end of term](https://www.ideastream.org/government-politics/2025-09-11/cleveland-councilmember-kerry-mccormack-resigns-before-end-of-term)
|
||||
|
||||
[^56]: [WKYC: Kerry McCormack to resign from Cleveland City Council on Oct. 3](https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/local/cleveland/cleveland-city-councilman-kerry-mccormack-resign-ward-3-seat-october-majority-leader-flock-safety-lauren-welch/95-6380bc59-b942-4c43-a0fc-b1a61f8f8fea)
|
||||
|
||||
[^57]: [Cleveland City Council Legistar: File #1367-2025](https://cityofcleveland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7714153&GUID=D5D4E9A9-CED2-4198-9998-FCD9349ED5A4&Options=ID%7CText%7CAttachments%7COther%7C&Search=flock)
|
||||
|
||||
[^58]: [Axios Cleveland: Cleveland mulls shift from ShotSpotter to Flock for gunshot detection](https://www.axios.com/local/cleveland/2025/11/14/cleveland-shotspotter-flock)
|
||||
|
||||
[^59]: [Signal Cleveland: City Council debates: Is ShotSpotter making Cleveland safer?](https://signalcleveland.org/cleveland-city-council-shotspotter-study-hearing/)
|
||||
|
||||
[^60]: [Cleveland Charter § 36: Emergency Measures](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/cleveland/latest/cleveland_oh/0-0-0-252)
|
||||
|
||||
[^61]: [Cleveland Charter § 108: Authorization of Contracts](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/cleveland/latest/cleveland_oh/0-0-0-627)
|
||||
|
||||
[^62]: [City of Cleveland: Division of Purchases & Supplies](https://www.clevelandohio.gov/city-hall/departments/finance/divisions/purchases-supplies)
|
||||
|
||||
[^63]: [Ohio Revised Code § 102.03](https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-102.03)
|
||||
|
||||
[^64]: [Cleveland Codified Ordinances Chapter 171: Employment Provisions](https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/cleveland/latest/cleveland_oh/0-0-0-4565)
|
||||
|
||||
[^65]: [Signal Cleveland: Kerry McCormack says he had 'no engagement' with city over Flock](https://signalcleveland.org/cleveland-city-council-kerry-mccormack-flock-safety-contract/)
|
||||
|
||||
[^66]: [News 5 Cleveland: More questions raised about Flock Safety in Cleveland](https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/more-questions-raised-about-flock-safety-in-cleveland-data-access-and-whos-watching)
|
||||
|
||||
[^67]: [Signal Cleveland: Cleveland to replace ShotSpotter with other gunshot-detection tech](https://signalcleveland.org/cleveland-to-replace-shotspotter-with-flock-safety/)
|
||||
|
||||
[^68]: [Cleveland Scene: Cleveland Puts Flock Expansion on Hold Amid Local Pushback](https://www.clevescene.com/news/cleveland-news/cleveland-puts-flock-expansion-on-hold-amid-local-pushback/)
|
||||
|
||||
[^69]: [News 5 Cleveland: Grassroots group presses Cleveland to end relationship with Flock Safety](https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/investigations/grassroots-group-presses-cleveland-to-end-relationship-with-flock-safety-expansion-plans-on-hold)
|
||||
|
||||
[^70]: [TechCrunch: Flock Safety quietly hired a sitting California mayor. Now he's suing Flock.](https://techcrunch.com/2025/01/08/flock-safety-quietly-hired-a-sitting-california-mayor-now-hes-suing-flock/)
|
||||
|
||||
[^71]: [DocumentCloud: Cabrera v. Flock Safety, Complaint](https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/25482232-flock-lawsuit-complaint/?embed=1)
|
||||
|
||||
[^72]: ["California Government Code § 1090"](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV§ionNum=1090.). California Legislative Information. Retrieved 2026-04-24.
|
||||
+60
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Flock Holding Closed Police Conference, Requires Police Consent for Marketing (Public Report)"
|
||||
source: "https://ipvm.com/reports/flock-closed-police-marketing"
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[ipvideomarket]]"
|
||||
published: 2026-05-04
|
||||
created: 2026-08-29
|
||||
description: "IPVM is the world's leading independent intelligence source for physical security, profiled by Time, The Atlantic, Wired and collaborated with the BBC, NY Times, Reuters, WaPo, WSJ, and more."
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- "clippings"
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Flock Holding Closed Police Conference, Requires Police Consent for Marketing
|
||||
|
||||
PUBLIC - This article does not require an IPVM subscription. Feel free to share.
|
||||
|
||||
Flock is turning a who's who of American policing into a captive commercial asset, shielded from outside scrutiny, through its closed law enforcement conference that blocks the public and press and requires every attendee to sign a mandatory marketing consent form as a condition of registration.
|
||||
|
||||
[Flock Forward,](https://www.flocksafety.com/flock-forward) scheduled August 18-20, 2026, in Atlanta, bills itself as "where leaders come together to shape the future of safety." The only non-law-enforcement voices in the room are, per the conference page, "invited commercial partners," meaning Flock's paying business partners. The public is excluded. So is the press.
|
||||
|
||||
**What the Consent Form Requires**
|
||||
|
||||
To register, attendees must check a mandatory box agreeing to Flock's Photo and Video Consent Form.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The checkbox cannot be skipped. There is no opt-out.
|
||||
|
||||
The [form is a binding commercial agreement](https://s.ipvm.com/uploads/embedded_file/911341dfa9c4ae128e7c80f221473272d2c68537f962ca88b325923f4916d0e1/06b16fba-45de-4ccf-ba41-96fcde6a4d88.pdf), not a courtesy notice. Attendees consent to be "interviewed, recorded, photographed, videotaped or filmed" for "marketing, publication, display or broadcast (print, web, digital display and all other forms of media and marketing)." All content becomes "the property of Flock Group Inc." Signatories "relinquish any present or future claim for compensation or reimbursement."
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://s.ipvm.com/uploads/embedded_file/911341dfa9c4ae128e7c80f221473272d2c68537f962ca88b325923f4916d0e1/06b16fba-45de-4ccf-ba41-96fcde6a4d88.pdf)
|
||||
|
||||
In plain terms: an officer who attends signs over their image, words, and professional affiliation to Flock's marketing operation, permanently and without compensation, before they walk in the door. There is no defensible justification for requiring this of public officials as a condition of attending a conference. It should be removed.
|
||||
|
||||
**A Private Corporation Shaping Public Safety, Without the Public**
|
||||
|
||||
The conference tagline: "where leaders come together to shape the future of safety," raises an obvious question: why is the public excluded from shaping the future of their own safety?
|
||||
|
||||
If a government agency held a closed law enforcement conference, it would at least be subject to FOIA requests, public records laws, and oversight mechanisms. Flock is not a government agency. It is a private corporation, [valued at $8.4 billion](https://ipvm.com/reports/flock-2026-fundraising), that derives virtually all of its revenue from public contracts funded by taxpayers. It operates a national surveillance network tracking the movements of ordinary Americans, tens of billions of times a month, across [5,000 law enforcement agencies](https://ipvm.com/reports/flock-2026-fundraising). The people whose tax dollars fund those agencies, and whose vehicles are tracked by that network, are not invited. The only outside voices in the room are companies that profit alongside Flock.
|
||||
|
||||
The $350 registration fee is a token contribution, not a price. Flock is subsidizing the real cost of the event because the return is not ticket revenue: it is the relationships, content, and marketing material extracted from the room under a mandatory consent agreement every officer signed before arriving.
|
||||
|
||||
Last year's Flock Forward drew more than 650 guests, including Chiefs of Police and city leaders. Their marketing video shows going to a baseball game and sitting in a premium indoor club seating:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The math makes this plain. The conference page advertises $350 for "all sessions, meals, and experiences" across three days in Atlanta. Their marketing video shows attendees in premium indoor club seating at a Braves game: tickets that run $250 to $800 per person on their own. A three-day conference at that scale costs many multiples of $350 per person to run.
|
||||
|
||||
**The Revolving Door Runs Into the Conference Room**
|
||||
|
||||
This is not the first Flock Forward, and the conference is part of a documented pattern of Flock using law enforcement relationships as a commercial engine. We documented how two Elk Grove PD officials [marketed Flock extensively before taking jobs at the company](https://ipvm.com/reports/offcials-flock), finding at least eight public occasions where they promoted Flock less than a year before joining it. A former San Diego police captain who [oversaw that city's Flock deployment joined Flock months after retiring](https://ipvm.com/news/573c49a0-9cb5-4c72-9d5c-c7039ba81754), prompting a city councilmember to call the relationship "totally inappropriate." A former DC Metropolitan Police CIO [joined Flock as Strategic Relations Manager](https://ipvm.com/news/8473ae79-efc6-4b98-9a9e-331ffc744338) after spearheading that city's Real-Time Crime Center. Flock has also [privately offered to draft pro-LPR op-eds](https://ipvm.com/reports/flock-offers-op-ed) for city prosecutors and [offered its top attorneys to provide courtroom testimony defending cities](https://ipvm.com/reports/flock-top-attorney-testimony) that use its systems. The conference is the logical extension of it all: a private, subsidized gathering where Flock deepens its grip on the law enforcement officials who decide whether to buy, keep, or expand its contracts, while the public that funds those contracts waits outside.
|
||||
|
||||
**The Protest Opportunity**
|
||||
|
||||
Flock can keep the press and public out of the conference itself. What it cannot do is keep them off the street outside.
|
||||
|
||||
Opposition to Flock has been [escalating in form, not just volume](https://ipvm.com/reports/protest-flock-4-26). City council appearances gave way to confronting installers in the field, which in turn led to [50+ demonstrators gathering outside Flock's Atlanta HQ](https://ipvm.com/reports/protest-flock-4-26). More than 60 cities have now [moved to terminate or pause their Flock contracts](https://ipvm.com/reports/protest-flock-4-26). A closed-door gathering of law enforcement chiefs and city officials in Atlanta at a known venue on known dates is the most concentrated and visible target the opposition has yet had.
|
||||
|
||||
There is also a certain irony in Flock's consent strategy. Flock has secured the legal right to use likenesses of police officials in its own marketing. What it cannot control is what happens on a public sidewalk. Any law enforcement official walking into a Flock-subsidized conference — at a company that has been found to [violate state privacy laws](https://ipvm.com/news/a3814dff-3e37-4240-8b6f-5cb9290037f8), and that the [ACLU has called "authoritarian tracking"](https://ipvm.com/reports/aclu-flock) — is walking in public.
|
||||
|
||||
Protesters with cameras have the same rights that Flock required those officers to sign away.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows"
|
||||
source: "https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/"
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[Jason Koebler]]"
|
||||
published: 2025-05-27
|
||||
created: 2026-08-19
|
||||
description: "Flock's automatic license plate reader (ALPR) cameras are in more than 5,000 communities around the U.S. Local police are doing lookups in the nationwide system for ICE."
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- "clippings"
|
||||
---
|
||||
Listen to the [404 Media Podcast](https://www.404media.co/the-404-media-podcast/)
|
||||
|
||||
Data from a license plate-scanning tool that is primarily marketed as a surveillance solution for small towns to combat crimes like car jackings or finding missing people is being used by ICE, according to data reviewed by 404 Media. Local police around the country are performing lookups in Flock’s AI-powered automatic license plate reader (ALPR) system for “immigration” related searches and as part of other ICE investigations, giving federal law enforcement side-door access to a tool that it currently does not have a formal contract for.
|
||||
|
||||
The [massive trove](https://www.muckrock.com/foi/danville-7714/foia-request-alpr-audit-181213/?ref=404media.co) [of lookup data](https://www.muckrock.com/foi/danville-7714/foia-request-alpr-audit-186112/?ref=404media.co) was obtained by researchers who asked to remain anonymous to avoid potential retaliation and shared with 404 Media. It shows more than 4,000 nation and statewide lookups by local and state police done either at the behest of the federal government or as an “informal” favor to federal law enforcement, or with a potential immigration focus, according to statements from police departments and sheriff offices collected by 404 Media. It shows that, while Flock does not have a contract with ICE, the agency sources data from Flock’s cameras by making requests to local law enforcement. The data reviewed by 404 Media was obtained using a public records request from the Danville, Illinois Police Department, and shows the Flock search logs from police departments around the country.
|
||||
|
||||
As part of a Flock search, police have to provide a “reason” they are performing the lookup. In the “reason” field for searches of Danville’s cameras, officers from across the U.S. wrote “immigration,” “ICE,” “ICE+ERO,” which is ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations, the section that focuses on deportations; “illegal immigration,” “ICE WARRANT,” and other immigration-related reasons. Although lookups mentioning ICE occurred across both the Biden and Trump administrations, all of the lookups that explicitly list “immigration” as their reason were made after Trump was inaugurated, according to the data.
|
||||
|
||||
💡
|
||||
|
||||
****Do you know anything else about Flock? We would love to hear from you. Using a non-work device, you can message Jason securely on Signal at jason.404 and Joseph at joseph.404****
|
||||
+116
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Inside the growing police use and misuse of Flock’s license-plate reader cameras"
|
||||
source: "https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/26/us/flock-cameras-surveillance-abuse"
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[Eric Levenson]]"
|
||||
published: 2026-07-26
|
||||
created: 2026-08-19
|
||||
description: "The arrests of two Milwaukee Police officers have put the spotlight on the surveillance technology that can be misused and abused."
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- "clippings"
|
||||
---
|
||||
Last December, Milwaukee Police Department internal affairs detectives began investigating an officer accused of misusing Flock, the department’s automated license-plate reader system.
|
||||
|
||||
The detectives investigating officer Josue Ayala found he secretly used Flock to learn the location of his romantic partner 124 times and that partner’s ex 55 times, according to a February [criminal complaint](https://mkepdpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Criminal-Complaint_3-Ayala-Josue.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
Ayala agreed to resign from the department and plead guilty to attempted misconduct in public office as part of a deal, according to court records.
|
||||
|
||||
Then earlier this month, one of the detectives who had investigated Ayala was himself arrested for misusing the Flock system. The detective, Tehrangi Chapman, admitted to using Flock to track two people and to secretly installing a GPS device on one person’s vehicle, [according to a criminal complaint](https://mkepdpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Criminal-Complaint_1-Chapman-Tehrangi-N-2026CF003239-Chapman-Tehrangi-N_30216526_1.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
The incidents are among at leasttwo dozen cases in which officers resigned or were arrested for allegedly abusing Flock’s automated license-plate reader system to stalk romantic interests, according to a tally from the [Institute for Justice](https://ij.org/police-have-reportedly-used-license-plate-readers-to-stalk-romantic-interests-at-least-14-times-in-recent-years/#), a nonprofit public interest law firm.
|
||||
|
||||
Just in the past month, five Albany police officers in Georgia were [arrested and fired](https://gbi.georgia.gov/press-releases/2026-07-06/gbi-arrests-five-former-albany-police-department-officers-misuse-license) for allegedly misusing Flock, and [police in Greer, South Carolina](https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1599171812253798&set=a.242577677913225), fired two officers for misusing the product.
|
||||
|
||||
The cases underscore the growing use – and misuse – of automated license-plate reader systems, known as ALPRs, that police departments across the country have adopted in recent years.
|
||||
|
||||
The technology has its proponents who laud its investigative power, while opponents call it amass surveillance system that violates privacy and civil liberties.
|
||||
|
||||
All agree that police abuse of the ALPR system, such as in Milwaukee, rattles the public’s trust.
|
||||
|
||||
“This case represents an abuse of power and a misuse of power. It results in a lack of trust from our community,” Milwaukee County deputy district attorney Matthew Torbenson said at Ayala’s sentencing hearing Wednesday. “That’s the story that is going to end and be printed today is about police misuse of the Flock system, when the truth of the matter is the vast majority of law enforcement appropriately uses that tool to investigate crime.”
|
||||
|
||||
In response to these concerns, Flock has taken steps to crack down on police abuse of its technology. Flock CEO and co-founder Garrett Langley told CNN in an interview the company last month launched an “audit assistance tool” that alerts an auditor to “abnormal” uses of its system.
|
||||
|
||||
“This is such a powerful tool, we don’t want to reduce the efficacy of the 99.99% of officers who go to work every single day and want to do good for their community,” Langley said.
|
||||
|
||||
## How Flock cameras work
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ALPRs are cameras – either mounted on vehicles or on fixed poles along public roads – that take images of a vehicle’s plates and other identifying characteristics and store that information in a database.
|
||||
|
||||
The system alerts police when a vehicle on a “hotlist,” such as one associated with a crime or a missing person, drives by a camera. Police can also search for a specific license plate number to see the vehicle’s recent movements. In addition, departments can share their information with neighboring agencies to better coordinate a response.
|
||||
|
||||
Flock Safety, based in Atlanta, is the largest such ALPR company and works with over 5,000 law enforcement agencies. The company says its network includes [more than 120,000 cameras](https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/the-price-of-free-lpr) across 49 states.
|
||||
|
||||
Founded in 2017, Flock [announced last March](https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/flock-safety-secures-major-funding) it was valued at $7.5 billion after its latest $275 million funding round from major Silicon Valley investors, who include Andreessen Horowitz and the Peter Thiel-backed Founders Fund.
|
||||
|
||||
Law enforcement officials have said the technology is helpful in solving crimes, particularly stolen vehicle cases. Notably, police used Flock cameras last year to track down the suspect in the [mass shooting at Brown University](https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/19/tech/flock-safety-ai-cameras-brown-suspect-privacy).
|
||||
|
||||
The Milwaukee Police Department sent CNN a summary of 24 cases that used ALPRs in April and another 26 cases in May. In one instance, ALPRs helped police catch a suspect accused of domestic violence, vehicle robbery and possession of a firearm. In another, the ALPR system helped officers locate and arrest a suspect with a warrant for strangulation.
|
||||
|
||||
“These results are only a small sampling of the impact this tool has, but illustrate the effectiveness of this technology as it relates to some of the most serious crimes that occur within our community,” Milwaukee police said in a statement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Limited studies on their effectiveness
|
||||
|
||||
Still, only a few studies have looked at the technology’s overall effectiveness. One recent study looked at the Atlantic City, New Jersey, police department’s use of ALPRs from 2022 to 2024 and found mixed results that were hard to separate from the [nationwide decline in crime over that same period](https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/10/us/us-violent-crime-rates-statistics).
|
||||
|
||||
“While the ALPR expansion did not reduce violent crime, it was associated with reductions in shootings, motor vehicle thefts, and property crime,” the study said.
|
||||
|
||||
Flock says it supported about [1 million law enforcement investigations](https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/how-effective-is-flock) last year and helped locate more than 10,000 missing persons. Langley believes Flock was a “big part” of the nationwide decline in crime the last few years, he told CNN.
|
||||
|
||||
“When I talk to my customers, when I travel around the country, there is a long list of success stories that would have been cold cases if not for Flock,” he said. “Time and time again, I’m hearing from my customers, ‘Crime is going down because of Flock. We are solving crime because of Flock.’”
|
||||
|
||||
Thaddeus Johnson, a former law enforcement official and now senior fellow at the Council on Criminal Justice think tank, told CNN that Flock’s ALPRs are great at generating leads but don’t solve everything.
|
||||
|
||||
“That really depends on the quality of your investigators, on your policies, your guardrails, the quality of your camera systems, how you maintain it, and those things like that,” he said. “So they can improve certain investigations, but it’s not that installing cameras automatically makes a community safer.”
|
||||
|
||||
## Critic calls LPRs ‘creepy’
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The technology has faced increasing backlash from those concerned about the creation of a camera system watching every vehicle’s movement. Some opponents have even taken the matter into their own hands and vandalized Flock’s cameras to take them out of commission.
|
||||
|
||||
ACLU senior policy counsel Chad Marlow said the technology is “creepy” and has spurred a broad opposition across the political spectrum.
|
||||
|
||||
“Everybody arrives at the same point, which is this is out of control. It has to be reined in,” he said.
|
||||
|
||||
The ACLU’s concerns stem from three key points related to the lack of guardrails on the system.
|
||||
|
||||
First, ALPRs can be used to find any vehicle that has passed by a camera and is not limited to cases involving serious felonies or missing children, and there is no requirement to get a warrant. Second, data-sharing between local police departments – or with the [Department of Homeland Security](https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/statement-network-sharing-use-cases-federal-cooperation) – can lead to the creation of a nationwide surveillance system that tracks vehicles around the country.
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, Flock’s vehicle data is stored for a default of 30 days before deletion. Marlow said that was a significant period of time.
|
||||
|
||||
“The longer you retain the data, the more troubling it becomes because it can reveal patterns of life,” Marlow said. “You can start to figure out what doctor’s offices a person goes to, what religious institutions, what political meetings, even where they sleep at night, just by tracking the patterns of their life.”
|
||||
|
||||
The arrests in Milwaukee reveal what can happen without these legal guardrails, critics say.
|
||||
|
||||
Officers using Flock had to write a brief explanation of the reason for conducting a search, but these explanations were vague. In Ayala’s case, he gave the reason for the search as “investigation,” according to the criminal complaint. Chapman listed the reason for his improper Flock searches as “training” and “test,” according to his complaint.
|
||||
|
||||
Michael Soyfer, an attorney with the Institute for Justice, the law firm that has filed lawsuits against Flock on Fourth Amendment grounds, said the underlying problem is police can use the system without a warrant or clear reason.
|
||||
|
||||
“As a consequence of the lack of those, you have police using all this data for personal reasons and for the wrong reasons. … Every officer basically gets to decide when to log in and search this database,” Soyfer said. “The instances of abuse that we’ve uncovered are really just the tip of the iceberg.”
|
||||
|
||||
Langley, the Flock CEO, said different communities were free to set different limits on how Flock can be used.
|
||||
|
||||
“We want to build those guardrails into our system so that every city, county or state can adopt this technology to have both safety and privacy,” he told CNN.
|
||||
|
||||
“We can have safety and privacy. Let’s do both,” he added. “Let’s give communities the controls and safeguards to select safety and privacy.”
|
||||
|
||||
## Ayala apologizes to the court
|
||||
|
||||
In the wake of Ayala’s arrest in Milwaukee earlier this year, [Chief Jeffrey Norman said](https://mkepdpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Press-Release-February-24-2025-Milwaukee-Police-Department-Officer-Criminally-Charged.pdf) he was “extremely disappointed” to learn about the incident and created new auditing processes.
|
||||
|
||||
The department now requires officers to provide a case number and explanation for a Flock search, and it began a monthly audit process, police said in a statement.
|
||||
|
||||
Chapman, the internal affairs detective, made an initial court appearance Friday on charges of felony misconduct in public office and misdemeanor misuse of a GPS device. His attorney did not respond to a request for comment.
|
||||
|
||||
At his sentencing Wednesday, Ayala apologized for his “poor judgment” that overshadowed his 11 years of service.
|
||||
|
||||
His defense and the prosecution had agreed to a plea deal that would result in a fine and no probation or jail time, the attorneys said in court.
|
||||
|
||||
However, Milwaukee County Judge Kristela Cervera sentenced him to one year of probation, citing the damage of his actions on the victims – and the community.
|
||||
|
||||
“That’s part of the damage that’s been caused here by Mr. Ayala’s actions,” [she said](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jv0JWIpClY8). “The loss of faith in the system, the Flock system, that the public was already hesitant with, that could affect policing of cases in Milwaukee County in the future.”
|
||||
|
||||
CNN’s Clare Duffy contributed to this report.
|
||||
+30
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife"
|
||||
source: "https://www.kwch.com/2022/10/31/kechi-police-lieutenant-arrested-using-police-technology-stalk-wife/"
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[Joe Baker]]"
|
||||
published: 2022-10-30
|
||||
created: 2026-08-19
|
||||
description: "A Kechi Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested by the Wichita Police Department after it was discovered he utilized his position within the Kechi police department to unlawfully access WPD’s flock license plate reader technology to monitor where his estranged wife was located."
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- "clippings"
|
||||
---
|
||||
WICHITA, Kan. (KWCH) - Kechi Police Lieutenant Victor Heiar was arrested by the Wichita Police Department after it was discovered he utilized his position within the police department to unlawfully access WPD’s flock license plate reader technology to monitor where his estranged wife was located.
|
||||
|
||||
Heiar has since been removed from the department. Heiar has been booked into Sedgwick County Jail for one count of stalking and one count of unlawful acts concerning computers.
|
||||
|
||||
”Obviously if you’re an officer and you have access to a lot of probably secret information that the rest of us don’t have, you’re not supposed to use that for your personal use,” Charles O’Hara, Defense Attorney with O’Hara and O’Hara said. “When it is repeated and it becomes a kind of abusive that it becomes stalking.”
|
||||
|
||||
O’Hara says a lot of times stalking can be covered by a civil case and not a criminal case.
|
||||
|
||||
“I don’t know how they’re charging with stalking,” said O’Hara. “I don’t know the specifics of any of this we are just kind of guessing, but I would assume it’s either he had an order against him and he violated that order or he has stalked to the point where the lady became fearful.”
|
||||
|
||||
Just this past week it was announced Wichita and Sedgwick County law enforcement would receive $1.6 million in federal funds for license plate readers and upgraded camera technology.
|
||||
|
||||
He says he sees some potential concerns with public safety if law enforcement doesn’t use its resources correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
“It is concerning I think when someone of a high rank in law enforcement may be misusing the tools that they have,” O’Hara said.
|
||||
|
||||
Private investigator Joseph Schillaci says while this situation needs to be addressed, he doesn’t see this situation being a common theme in police departments. Schillaci says public safety isn’t a concern.
|
||||
|
||||
“Any time something like this comes up yes it absolutely needs to be addressed,” Schillaci said. “As far as public concern and public safety these circumstances are isolated.”
|
||||
+163
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "License Plate Surveillance Logs Reveal Racist Policing Against Romani People"
|
||||
source: "https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/license-plate-surveillance-logs-reveal-racist-policing-against-romani-people"
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[Rindala Alajaji]]"
|
||||
- "[[Dave Maass]]"
|
||||
published: 2025-11-03
|
||||
created: 2026-08-19
|
||||
description: "More than 80 law enforcement agencies across the United States have used language perpetuating harmful stereotypes against Romani people when searching the nationwide Flock Safety automated license plate reader (ALPR) network, according to audit logs obtained and analyzed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation."
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- "clippings"
|
||||
---
|
||||
DEEPLINKS BLOG
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- [Español](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11/license-plate-surveillance-logs-reveal-racist-policing-against-romani-people?language=es)
|
||||
|
||||
More than 80 law enforcement agencies across the United States have used language perpetuating harmful stereotypes against Romani people when searching the nationwide Flock Safety automated license plate reader (ALPR) network, according to audit logs obtained and analyzed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
|
||||
|
||||
When police run a search through the Flock Safety network, which links thousands of ALPR systems, they are prompted to leave a reason and/or case number for the search. Between June 2024 and October 2025, cops performed hundreds of searches for license plates using terms such as "roma" and "g\*psy," and in many instances, without any mention of a suspected crime. Other uses include "g\*psy vehicle," "g\*psy group," "possible g\*psy," "roma traveler" and "g\*psy ruse," perpetuating systemic harm by demeaning individuals based on their race or ethnicity.
|
||||
|
||||
These queries were run through thousands of police departments' systems—and it appears that none of these agencies flagged the searches as inappropriate.
|
||||
|
||||
These searches are, by definition, racist.
|
||||
|
||||
## Word Choices and Flock Searches
|
||||
|
||||
We are using the terms "Roma" and “Romani people” as umbrella terms, recognizing that they represent different but related groups. Since 2020, the [U.S. federal government](https://www.state.gov/defining-anti-roma-racism) has officially recognized "Anti-Roma Racism" as including behaviors such as "stereotyping Roma as persons who engage in criminal behavior" and using the slur "g\*psy." According to the U.S. Department of State, this language “leads to the treatment of Roma as an alleged alien group and associates them with a series of pejorative stereotypes and distorted images that represent a specific form of racism.”
|
||||
|
||||
Nevertheless, police officers have run hundreds of searches for license plates using the terms "roma" and "g\*psy." (Unlike the police ALPR queries we’ve uncovered, we substitute an asterisk for the Y to avoid repeating this racist slur). In many cases, these terms have been used on their own, with no mention of crime. In other cases, the terms have been used in contexts like "g\*psy scam" and "roma burglary," when ethnicity should have no relevance to how a crime is investigated or prosecuted.
|
||||
|
||||
A “g\*psy scam” and “roma burglary” do not exist in criminal law separate from any other type of fraud or burglary. Several agencies contacted by EFF have since acknowledged the inappropriate use and expressed efforts to address the issue internally.
|
||||
|
||||
"The use of the term does not reflect the values or expected practices of our department," a representative of the Palos Heights (IL) Police Department wrote to EFF after being confronted with two dozen searches involving the term "g\*psy." "We do not condone the use of outdated or offensive terminology, and we will take this inquiry as an opportunity to educate those who are unaware of the negative connotation and to ensure that investigative notations and search reasons are documented in a manner that is accurate, professional, and free of potentially harmful language."
|
||||
|
||||
Of course, the broader issue is that allowing "g\*psy" or "Roma" as a reason for a search isn't just offensive, it implies the criminalization an ethnic group. In fact, the Grand Prairie Police Department in Texas searched for "g\*psy" six times while using Flock's " [Convoy](https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/reduce-case-backlogs-and-overtime-with-tech) " feature, which allows an agency to identify vehicles traveling together—in essence targeting an entire traveling community of Roma without specifying a crime.
|
||||
|
||||
At the bottom of this post is a list of agencies and the terms they used when searching the Flock system.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anti-Roma Racism in an Age of Surveillance
|
||||
|
||||
Racism against Romani people has been a problem for centuries, with one of its most horrific manifestations during the Holocaust, when the Third Reich and its allies perpetuated genocide by murdering hundreds of thousands of Romani people and sterilizing thousands more. Despite efforts by [the UN](https://www.un.org/en/fight-racism/vulnerable-groups/roma-sinti-travellers) and [EU](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20200918STO87401/roma-what-discrimination-do-they-face-and-what-does-eu-do) to combat anti-Roma discrimination, this form of racism persists. As [scholars](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/20/romani-americans-struggle-with-inherent-criminality-stereotypes) Margareta Matache and Mary T. Bassett explain, it is perpetuated by modern American policing practices:
|
||||
|
||||
> In recent years, police departments have set up task forces specialised in “G\*psy crimes”, appointed “G\*psy crime” detectives, and organised police training courses on “G\*psy criminality”. The National Association of Bunco Investigators (NABI), an organisation of law enforcement professionals focusing on “non-traditional organised crime”, has even created a database of individuals arrested or suspected of criminal activity, which clearly marked those who were Roma.
|
||||
|
||||
Thus, it is no surprise that a [2020 Harvard University survey](https://fxb.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Romani-realities-report-final-11.30.2020-1.pdf) of Romani Americans found that 4 out of 10 respondents reported being subjected to racial profiling by police. This demonstrates the ongoing challenges they face due to systemic racism and biased policing.
|
||||
|
||||
Notably, many police agencies using surveillance technologies like ALPRs have adopted some sort of basic policy against biased policing or the use of these systems to target people based on race or ethnicity. But even when such policies are in place, an agency’s failure to enforce them allows these discriminatory practices to persist. These searches were also run through the systems of thousands of other police departments that may have their own policies and state laws that prohibit bias-based policing—yet none of those agencies appeared to have flagged the searches as inappropriate.
|
||||
|
||||
The Flock search data in question here shows that surveillance technology exacerbates racism, and even well-meaning policies to address bias can quickly fall apart without proper oversight and accountability.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cops In Their Own Words
|
||||
|
||||
EFF reached out to a sample of the police departments that ran these searches. Here are five representative responses we received from police departments in Illinois, California, and Virginia. They do not inspire confidence.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 1\. Lake County Sheriff's Office, IL
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
A screen grab of three searches
|
||||
|
||||
In June 2025, the Lake County Sheriff's Office ran three searches for a dark colored pick-up truck, using the reason: "G\*PSY Scam." The search covered 1,233 networks, representing 14,467 different ALPR devices.
|
||||
|
||||
In response to EFF, a sheriff's representative wrote via email:
|
||||
|
||||
> *“Thank you for reaching out and for bringing this to our attention. We certainly understand your concern regarding the use of that terminology, which we do not condone or support, and we want to assure you that we are looking into the matter.*
|
||||
>
|
||||
> *Any sort of discriminatory practice is strictly prohibited at our organization. If you have the time to take a look at our commitment to the community and our strong relationship with the community, I firmly believe you will see discrimination is not tolerated and is quite frankly repudiated by those serving in our organization.*
|
||||
>
|
||||
> *We appreciate you bringing this to our attention so we can look further into this and address it.”*
|
||||
|
||||
#### 2\. Sacramento Police Department, CA
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
A screen grab of three searches
|
||||
|
||||
In May 2025, the Sacramento Police Department ran six searches using the term "g\*psy." The search covered 468 networks, representing 12,885 different ALPR devices.
|
||||
|
||||
In response to EFF, a police representative wrote:
|
||||
|
||||
> *“Thank you again for reaching out. We looked into the searches you mentioned and were able to confirm the entries. We’ve since reminded the team to be mindful about how they document investigative reasons. The entry reflected an investigative lead, not a disparaging reference.*
|
||||
>
|
||||
> *We appreciate the chance to clarify.”*
|
||||
|
||||
#### 3\. Palos Heights Police Department, IL
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
A screen grab of three searches
|
||||
|
||||
In September 2024, the Palos Heights Police Department ran more than two dozen searches using terms such as "g\*psy vehicle," "g\*psy scam" and "g\*psy concrete vehicle." Most searches hit roughly 1,000 networks.
|
||||
|
||||
In response to EFF, a police representative said the searches were related to a singular criminal investigation into a vehicle involved in a "suspicious circumstance/fraudulent contracting incident" and is "not indicative of a general search based on racial or ethnic profiling." However, the agency acknowledged the language was inappropriate:
|
||||
|
||||
> *“The use of the term does not reflect the values or expected practices of our department. We do not condone the use of outdated or offensive terminology, and we will take this inquiry as an opportunity to educate those who are unaware of the negative connotation and to ensure that investigative notations and search reasons are documented in a manner that is accurate, professional, and free of potentially harmful language.*
|
||||
>
|
||||
> *We appreciate your outreach on this matter and the opportunity to provide clarification.”*
|
||||
|
||||
#### 4\. Irvine Police Department, CA
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
A screen grab of three searches
|
||||
|
||||
In February and May 2025, the Irvine Police Department ran eight searches using the term "roma" in the reason field. The searches covered 1,420 networks, representing 29,364 different ALPR devices.
|
||||
|
||||
In a call with EFF, an IPD representative explained that the cases were related to a series of organized thefts. However, they acknowledged the issue, saying, "I think it's an opportunity for our agency to look at those entries and to use a case number or use a different term."
|
||||
|
||||
#### 5\. Fairfax County Police Department, VA
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
A screen grab of three searches
|
||||
|
||||
Between December 2024 and April 2025, the Fairfax County Police Department ran more than 150 searches involving terms such as "g\*psy case" and "roma crew burglaries." Fairfax County PD continued to defend its use of this language.
|
||||
|
||||
In response to EFF, a police representative wrote:
|
||||
|
||||
> *“Thank you for your inquiry. When conducting searches in investigative databases, our detectives must use the exact case identifiers, terms, or names connected to a criminal investigation in order to properly retrieve information. These entries reflect terminology already tied to specific cases and investigative files from other agencies, not a bias or judgment about any group of people. The use of such identifiers does not reflect bias or discrimination and is not inconsistent with our Bias-Based Policing policy within our* [*Human Relations General Order.*](https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/police/sites/police/files/assets/generalorders/go-002.pdf)”
|
||||
|
||||
## A National Trend
|
||||
|
||||
Roma individuals and families are not the only ones being systematically and discriminatorily targeted by ALPR surveillance technologies. For example, Flock audit logs show agencies ran 400 more searches using terms targeting [Traveller](https://travellermovement.org.uk/gypsy-roma-and-traveller-history-and-culture) communities more generally, with a specific focus on [Irish Travellers](https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/irish-travelers), often without any mention of a crime.
|
||||
|
||||
Across the country, these tools are enabling and amplifying racial profiling by embedding longstanding policing biases into surveillance technologies. For example, [data from Oak Park, IL](https://www.freedomtothriveop.com/blog/84-of-the-drivers-stopped-by-oak-park-police-in-a-flock-traffic-stops-were-black), show that 84% of drivers stopped in Flock-related traffic incidents were Black—despite Black people making up only 19% of the local population. ALPR systems are far from being neutral tools for public safety and are increasingly being used to fuel discriminatory policing practices against historically marginalized people.
|
||||
|
||||
The racially coded language in Flock's logs mirrors long-standing patterns of discriminatory policing. Terms like "furtive movements," "suspicious behavior," and "high crime area" [have always been cited by police](https://ccrjustice.org/home/blog/2016/03/23/requiem-suspicious-bulge) to try to justify stops and searches of Black, Latine, and Native communities. These phrases might not appear in official logs because they're embedded earlier in enforcement—in the traffic stop without clear cause, the undocumented stop-and-frisk, the intelligence bulletin flagging entire neighborhoods as suspect. They function invisibly until a body-worn camera, court filing, or audit brings them to light. Flock's network didn’t create racial profiling; it industrialized it, turning deeply encoded and vague language into scalable surveillance that can search thousands of cameras across state lines.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Two Flock safety cameras at 90 degrees on a pole with a solar panel
|
||||
|
||||
## The Path Forward
|
||||
|
||||
U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-OR, recently [recommended](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wyden_letter_to_flock.pdf) that local governments reevaluate their decisions to install Flock Safety in their communities. We agree, but we also understand that sometimes elected officials need to see the abuse with their own eyes first.
|
||||
|
||||
We know which agencies ran these racist searches, and they should be held accountable. But we also know that the vast majority of Flock Safety's clients—thousands of police and sheriffs—also allowed those racist searches to run through their Flock Safety systems unchallenged.
|
||||
|
||||
Elected officials must act decisively to address the racist policing enabled by Flock's infrastructure. First, they should demand a complete audit of all ALPR searches conducted in their jurisdiction and a review of search logs to determine (a) whether their police agencies participated in discriminatory policing and (b) what safeguards, if any, exist to prevent such abuse. Second, officials should institute immediate restrictions on data-sharing through Flock's nationwide network. As demonstrated by California law, for example, police agencies [should not be able to share their ALPR data](https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2023-dle-06.pdf) with federal authorities or out-of-state agencies, thus eliminating a vehicle for discriminatory searches spreading across state lines.
|
||||
|
||||
Ultimately, elected officials must terminate Flock Safety contracts entirely. The evidence is now clear: audit logs and internal policies alone cannot prevent a surveillance system from becoming a tool for racist policing. The fundamental architecture of Flock—thousands of cameras feeding into a nationwide searchable network—makes discrimination inevitable when enforcement mechanisms fail.
|
||||
|
||||
As Sen. Wyden astutely explained, "local elected officials can best protect their constituents from the inevitable abuses of Flock cameras by removing Flock from their communities.”
|
||||
|
||||
## Table Overview and Notes
|
||||
|
||||
The following table compiles terms used by agencies to describe the reasons for searching the Flock Safety ALPR database. In a small number of cases, we removed additional information such as case numbers, specific incident details, and officers' names that were present in the reason field.
|
||||
|
||||
We removed one agency from the list due to the agency indicating that the word was a person's name and not a reference to Romani people.
|
||||
|
||||
In general, we did not include searches that used the term "Romanian," although many of those may also be indicative of anti-Roma bias. We also did not include uses of "traveler" or “Traveller” when it did not include a clear ethnic modifier; however, we believe many of those searches are likely relevant.
|
||||
|
||||
A text-based version of the spreadsheet is available [here](https://www.eff.org/document/flock-alpr-roma-related-searches).
|
||||
|
||||
November 12, 2025 update: Due to a clerical error a term was misattributed to Eugene Police Department in Oregon. We regret the error.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Event registration form Event registration form
|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Too Little, Too Late: Flock Admits Their Technology Needs Reforms"
|
||||
source: "https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/08/too-little-too-late-flock-admits-their-technology-needs-reforms"
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[Matthew Guariglia]]"
|
||||
published: 2026-08-13
|
||||
created: 2026-08-19
|
||||
description: "The reforms are a combination of long overdue changes along with some cosmetic fixes that fail to address the fundamental dangers of this technology."
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- "clippings"
|
||||
---
|
||||
DEEPLINKS BLOG
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Flock Safety, the embattled vendor of mass surveillance technology, has rolled out a handful of new reforms intended to appease the justified nationwide anger that has seen [scores of towns](https://www.newsnationnow.com/business/tech/flock-camera-contracts-canceled-23-states/) [cancel or suspend](https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/breaking-the-news/multiple-cities-minnesota-cancel-contracts-flock/89-bfd002b1-6830-4139-8287-cea513e602a0) their contracts with the company for [automated license plate readers](https://sls.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs) (ALPRs). The reforms are a combination of long overdue changes along with some cosmetic fixes that fail to address the fundamental dangers of this technology.
|
||||
|
||||
We should not be letting companies decide how much privacy we deserve.
|
||||
|
||||
So, what do these reforms actually do?
|
||||
|
||||
The most consequential is Flock’s default setting of an optional 7-day retention period for ALPR data, down from its original default optional 30-day retention period. This means if police want to retain data beyond the duration of their retention setting, they need to access “Evidence Mode,” i.e., when the desired data is associated with an active investigation and not just a fishing expedition. This is significant because, in at least some circumstances, Flock has [previously charged](https://www.eff.org/document/flock-contract) its customers to extend their retention period. So, while towns can likely easily flip the switch to longer retention periods, it might come with a price tag some cities will be unwilling to pay.
|
||||
|
||||
Flock also has two other, likely easier-to-bypass reforms. The first is offense filtering so that cities can enable other departments to access their ALPR data only if they are investigating certain crimes, e.g., murder or robbery but not immigration-related investigations. The second is supposedly beefing up their audit feature and proactively locking out officers who file suspicious requests for data. The major problem here is the fact that Flock’s enhanced audit and transparency tools help to address a problem that Flock itself has created—an abusable mass surveillance system that tracks all cars all the time.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to these reforms, there is also a tone shift coming from Flock’s CEO, Garrett Langley. Langley went from calling the [DeFlock movement](https://deflock.org/) “terrorists” ([which he has since apologized for](https://ipvm.com/reports/flock-trump)) and saying that the wave of anti-surveillance anger was [more about the current federal administration than it was specifically about his company](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/she-got-abortion-so-texas-cop-used-83000-cameras-track-her-down), to a more conciliatory tone that acknowledges some of the problems of [dangerous surveillance](https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/wrong-person-wrong-car-innocent-165054399.html), [mission creep](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/more-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-school-residency-verification-background), and [police abuse](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/12/us/georgia-sheriffs-flock-cameras-stalking.html). Just look at this [report from the BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crrv1rjwgl9o):
|
||||
|
||||
> “Historically, my point of view as a chief executive of a private company was, I don't know if I should be making these decisions. I don't know if it's my job to say how long data should be retained,” Langley said.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> He added that he has come to agree with groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation that police should need an active case number to search Flock's data.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> “They're right. I think it should be required.”
|
||||
|
||||
**To be clear, our position has long been that police, at a minimum,** [**need to get a warrant**](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/05/more-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-school-residency-verification-background)**, signed by a judge, in order to search for historic ALPR data regarding specific vehicles.** For us, it’s common sense: if police want to dip into historic ALPR data like they were going back in time to retroactively follow your comings and goings, they need a warrant.
|
||||
|
||||
Fundamentally, these reforms leave us wondering: what is stopping Flock from reversing course on them if their law enforcement customers respond by defecting to another ALPR vendor? Nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
This all leads to the bigger and more important issue: We should not be letting companies decide how much privacy we deserve. If our privacy is determined by how much surveillance technology vendors decide is *too much surveillance*, then we’re really out of luck. It shouldn’t be up to Flock or any other ALPR vendor to decide how long police can collect and retain data on millions, if not hundreds of millions, of innocent people. We need lawmakers to step up and pass laws that restrict police’s use of surveillance technology. After all, the surveillance business model is the problem, and a few company-imposed slapdash reforms aren’t going to change that.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related Issues
|
||||
|
||||
## Tags
|
||||
|
||||
Event registration form Event registration form
|
||||
|
||||
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||||
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