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title: 10 (Not So) Hidden Dangers of Age Verification
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source: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/10-not-so-hidden-dangers-age-verification
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author:
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- "[[Rindala Alajaji]]"
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published: 2025-12-08
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created: 2026-04-21
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description: It’s nearly the end of 2025, and half of the US and the UK now require you to upload your ID or scan your face to watch “sexual content.” A handful of states and Australia now have various requirements to verify your age before you can create a social media account.Age-verification laws may sound...
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tags:
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- clippings
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- Privacy
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---
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[](https://www.eff.org/Privacys-Defender "Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance")[](https://www.eff.org/Privacys-Defender "Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance")
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DEEPLINKS BLOG
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**Share It**
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- [Español](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/10-not-so-hidden-dangers-age-verification?language=es)
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It’s nearly the end of 2025, and [half of the US](https://www.404media.co/missouri-age-verification-law-porn-id-check-vpns/) and [the UK](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/americans-be-warned-lessons-reddits-chaotic-uk-age-verification-rollout) now require you to upload your ID or scan your face to watch “sexual content.” A [handful of states](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media_age_verification_laws_in_the_United_States#Summary) and [Australia](https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/australia-enforce-social-media-age-limit-16-week-128064519) now have various requirements to verify your age before you can create a social media account.
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Age-verification laws may sound straightforward to some: protect young people online by making everyone prove their age. But in reality, these mandates force users into one of two flawed systems— [mandatory ID checks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/12/effs-2024-battle-against-online-age-verification-defending-youth-privacy-and-free) or [biometric scans](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/face-scans-estimate-our-age-creepy-af-and-harmful) —and *both* are deeply discriminatory. These proposals burden everyone’s right to speak and access information online, and structurally excludes the very people who rely on the internet most. In short, although these laws are often passed with the intention to protect children from harm, the reality is that these laws harm both adults and children.
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Here’s who gets hurt, and how:
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### 1\. Adults Without IDs Get Locked Out
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Document-based verification assumes everyone has the right ID, in the right name, at the right address. About 15 million adult U.S. citizens [don’t have a driver’s license](https://cdce.umd.edu/sites/cdce.umd.edu/files/pubs/Voter%20ID%202023%20survey%20Key%20Results%20Jan%202024%20%281%29.pdf), and 2.6 million lack any government-issued photo ID at all. Another [34.5 million adults](https://cdce.umd.edu/sites/cdce.umd.edu/files/pubs/Voter%20ID%202023%20survey%20Key%20Results%20Jan%202024%20%281%29.pdf) don't have a driver's license or state ID with their current name and address.
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[Specifically](https://cdce.umd.edu/sites/cdce.umd.edu/files/pubs/Voter%20ID%202023%20survey%20Key%20Results%20Jan%202024%20%281%29.pdf):
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- 18% of Black adults don't have a driver's license at all.
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- Black and Hispanic Americans are disproportionately less likely to have current licenses.
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- Undocumented immigrants often cannot obtain state IDs or driver's licenses.
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- People with disabilities are less likely to have current identification.
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- Lower-income Americans face greater barriers to maintaining valid IDs.
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Some laws allow platforms to ask for financial documents like credit cards or mortgage records instead. But they still overlook the fact that nearly 35% of U.S. adults also [don't own homes](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHORUSQ156N), and close to 20% of households [don't have credit cards](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2022-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202305.pdf). Immigrants, regardless of legal status, may also be unable to obtain credit cards or other financial documentation.
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### 2\. Communities of Color Face Higher Error Rates
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Platforms that rely on AI-based age-estimation systems often use a webcam selfie to guess users’ ages. But these algorithms don’t work equally well for everyone. [Research has consistently shown](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/sep/19/how-accurate-are-age-checks-for-australias-under-16s-social-media-ban-what-trial-data-reveals) that they are less accurate for people with Black, Asian, Indigenous, and Southeast Asian backgrounds; that they often misclassify those adults as being under 18; and sometimes take longer to process, creating unequal access to online spaces. This mirrors the [well-documented](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/10/face-recognition-isnt-just-face-identification-and-verification) racial bias in facial recognition technologies. The result is that technology’s inherent biases can block people from speaking online or accessing others’ speech.
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### 3\. People with Disabilities Face More Barriers
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Age-verification mandates most harshly affect people with disabilities. Facial recognition systems routinely fail to [recognize faces with physical differences](https://www.wired.com/story/when-face-recognition-doesnt-know-your-face-is-a-face/), affecting an estimated 100 million people worldwide who live with facial differences, and “liveness detection” can exclude folks with limited mobility. As these technologies become gatekeepers to online spaces, people with disabilities find themselves increasingly blocked from essential services and platforms with no specified appeals processes that account for disability.
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Document-based systems also don't solve this problem—as mentioned earlier, people with disabilities are also less likely to possess current driver's licenses, so document-based age-gating technologies are equally exclusionary.
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### 4\. Transgender and Non-Binary People Are Put At Risk
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Age-estimation technologies [perform worse](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359246) on transgender individuals and cannot classify non-binary genders at all. For the 43% of transgender Americans [who lack identity documents](https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/trans-voter-id-impact/) that [correctly reflect](https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/gender-marker-press-release/) their name or gender, age verification creates an impossible choice: provide documents with dead names and incorrect gender markers, potentially outing themselves in the process, or lose access to online platforms entirely—a risk that no one should be forced to take just to use social media or access legal content.
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### 5\. Anonymity Becomes a Casualty
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Age-verification systems are, at their core, surveillance systems. By requiring identity verification to access basic online services, we risk creating an internet where anonymity is a thing of the past. For people who [rely on anonymity](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/age-verification-mandates-would-undermine-anonymity-online) for safety, this is a serious issue. [Domestic abuse survivors](https://www.domesticshelters.org/articles/technology/protect-your-digital-life-when-leaving-an-abuser) need to stay anonymous to hide from abusers who could track them through their online activities. [Journalists](https://cpj.org/2021/11/digital-physical-safety-protecting-confidential-sources/), activists, and whistleblowers regularly use anonymity to protect sources and organize without facing retaliation or government surveillance. And in countries under authoritarian rule, anonymity is often the only way to access banned resources or share information without being silenced. Age-verification systems that demand government IDs or biometric data would strip away these protections, leaving the most vulnerable exposed.
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### 6\. Young People Lose Access to Essential Information
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Because state-imposed age-verification rules either block young people from social media or require them to get parental permission before logging on, they can deprive minors of access to important information about their health, sexuality, and gender. Many U.S. states mandate “ [abstinence only](https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/sex-education/sex-education-laws-and-state-attacks) ” sexual health education, making the internet a key resource for education and self-discovery. But age-verification laws can end up blocking young people from accessing that critical information. And this isn't just about porn, it’s about [sex education](https://educateusfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/FSC-v.-Paxton-1.pdf), mental health resources, and even [important literature](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/banned-bluest-eye/). Some states and countries may start [going after content](https://www.advocatesforyouth.org/siecus-and-advocates-for-youth-oppose-the-kids-online-safety-act-kosa/) they deem “ [harmful to minors](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/book-bans-internet-bans-wyoming-lets-parents-control-whole-states-access-internet),” which could include anything from books on sexual health to art, history, and even award-winning novels. And let’s be clear: these laws often get used to target anything that challenges certain political or cultural narratives, from diverse educational materials to media that simply includes themes of sexuality or gender diversity. What begins as a “protection” for kids could easily turn into a full-on censorship movement, blocking content that’s actually vital for minors’ development, education, and well-being.
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This is also especially harmful to [homeschoolers](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/kids-online-safety-act-homeschooled-kids), who rely on the internet for research, online courses, and exams. For many, the internet is central to their education and social lives. The internet is also crucial for homeschoolers' mental health, as many already struggle with isolation. Age-verification laws would restrict access to resources that are essential for their education and well-being.
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### 7\. LGBTQ+ Youth Are Denied Vital Lifelines
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For many LGBTQ+ young people, especially those with unsupportive or abusive families, the internet [can be a lifeline](https://www.thetrevorproject.org/research-briefs/online-experiences-and-mental-health-of-lgbtq-young-people/). For young people facing family rejection or violence due to their sexuality or gender identity, social media platforms often provide crucial access to support networks, mental health resources, and communities that affirm their identities. Age verification systems that require parental consent threaten to cut them from these crucial supports.
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When parents must consent to or monitor their children's social media accounts, LGBTQ+ youth who lack family support lose these vital connections. LGBTQ+ youth are also [disproportionately likely](https://nn4youth.org/learn/lgbtq-homeless-youth/) to be unhoused and lack access to [identification](https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-id-card-policies-for-lgbtq-youths-experiencing-homelessness/) or parental consent, further marginalizing them.
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### 8\. Youth in Foster Care Systems Are Completely Left Out
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Age verification bills that require parental consent fail to account for young people in foster care, particularly those in group homes without legal guardians who can provide consent, or with temporary foster parents who cannot prove guardianship. These systems effectively exclude some of the most vulnerable young people from accessing online platforms and resources they may desperately need.
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### 9\. All of Our Personal Data is Put at Risk
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An age-verification system also creates acute privacy risks for adults and young people. Requiring users to upload sensitive personal information (like government-issued IDs or [biometric data](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/face-scans-estimate-our-age-creepy-af-and-harmful)) to verify their age creates serious privacy and security risks. Under these laws, users would not just momentarily display their ID like one does when accessing [a liquor store](https://www.woodhullfoundation.org/fact-checked/online-age-verification-is-not-the-same-as-flashing-your-id-at-a-liquor-store/), for example. Instead, they’d submit their ID to third-party companies, raising major concerns over who receives, stores, and controls that data. Once uploaded, this personal information could be exposed, mishandled, or even breached, as we've seen with [past](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/hack-age-verification-company-shows-privacy-danger-social-media-laws) [data](https://www.404media.co/the-discord-hack-is-every-users-worst-nightmare/) [hacks](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce87rer52k3o). Age-verification systems are no strangers to being compromised—companies like [AU10TIX](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/hack-age-verification-company-shows-privacy-danger-social-media-laws) and platforms like [Discord](https://www.404media.co/the-discord-hack-is-every-users-worst-nightmare/) have faced high-profile data breaches, exposing users’ most sensitive information for months or even years.
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The more places personal data passes through, the higher the chances of it being misused or stolen. Users are left with little control over their own privacy once they hand over these immutable details, making this approach to age verification a serious risk for identity theft, blackmail, and other privacy violations. Children are already a major target for identity theft, and these mandates perversely increase the risk that they will be harmed.
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### 10\. All of Our Free Speech Rights Are Trampled
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The internet is today’s public square—the main place where people come together to share ideas, organize, learn, and build community. Even the Supreme Court has [recognized](https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1194) that social media platforms are among the most powerful tools ordinary people have to be heard.
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Age-verification systems inevitably block some adults from accessing lawful speech and allow some young people under 18 users to slip through anyway. Because the systems are both over-inclusive (blocking adults) and under-inclusive (failing to block people under 18), they restrict lawful speech in ways that violate the First Amendment.
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## The Bottom Line
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Age-verification mandates create barriers along lines of race, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, immigration status, and socioeconomic class. While these requirements threaten everyone’s privacy and free-speech rights, they fall heaviest on communities already facing systemic obstacles.
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The internet is essential to how people speak, learn, and participate in public life. When access depends on flawed technology or hard-to-obtain documents, we don’t just inconvenience users, we deepen existing inequalities and silence the people who most need these platforms. As outlined, every available method—facial age estimation, document checks, financial records, or parental consent—systematically excludes or harms marginalized people. The real question isn’t whether these systems discriminate, but how extensively.
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## Related Issues
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**Share It**
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---
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title: Age Verification Mandates Would Undermine Anonymity Online
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source: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/age-verification-mandates-would-undermine-anonymity-online
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author:
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- "[[Jason Kelley]]"
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- "[[Adam Schwartz]]"
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published: 2023-03-10
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created: 2026-06-27
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description: Age verification systems are surveillance systems. Mandatory age verification, and with it, mandatory identity verification, is the wrong approach to protecting young people online. It would force websites to require visitors to prove their age by submitting information such as government-issued...
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tags:
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- clippings
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- Privacy
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---
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[](https://www.eff.org/livestream-repair "EFFecting Change: If You Own It, Why Can't You Fix It? on July 23")[](https://www.eff.org/livestream-repair "EFFecting Change: If You Own It, Why Can't You Fix It? on July 23")
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DEEPLINKS BLOG
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- [Español](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/age-verification-mandates-would-undermine-anonymity-online?language=es)
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Age verification systems are surveillance systems. Mandatory age verification, and with it, mandatory identity verification, is the wrong approach to protecting young people online. It would force websites to require visitors to prove their age by submitting information such as government-issued identification. This scheme would lead us further towards an internet where our private data is collected and sold by default. The tens of millions of Americans who do not have government-issued identification may lose access to much of the internet. And anonymous access to the web could cease to exist.
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### Why We Are Against Age Verification Mandates
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Age verification laws don’t just impact young people. It’s necessary to confirm the age of all website visitors, in order to keep out one select age group.
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Once information is shared to verify age, there’s no way for a website visitor to be certain that the data they’re handing over is not going to be retained and used by the website, or further shared or even sold. While some age verification mandates have limits on retention and disclosure of this data, significant risk remains. Users are forced to trust that the website they visit, or its third-party verification service, both of which could be fly-by-night companies with no published privacy standards, are following these rules.
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Further, there is risk that website employees will misuse the data, or that thieves will steal it. The more information a website collects, the more chances there are for it to get into the hands of a marketing company, a bad actor, or someone who has filed a subpoena for it. This would inevitably lead to further data breaches, because these laws won’t just affect companies that are big enough to have robust data protection. If a website misuses or mishandles the data, the visitor might never find out. And if they do, they might lack an adequate enforcement mechanism. For example, one r [ecent age verification law](https://legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1289498) requires a user to prove “damages resulting from” the unlawful retention of data, in order to hold the website accountable in court—a difficult bar to reach.
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These mandates wouldn’t just kick young people offline. There are tens of millions of U.S. residents [without a form](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/debunking-misinformation-photo-id) of government-issued identification. They could also be kept offline if age verification is required. These are primarily lower-income people who are [often already marginalized](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/getting-a-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec-20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html), and for whom the internet may be a critical part of life.
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### No Age Verification Method Is Foolproof
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Last year, France’s Audiovisual and Digital Communication Regulatory Authority ordered several sites with adult content to implement age verification. Then France’s National Commission on Informatics and Liberty, CNIL, published [a detailed analysis](https://www.cnil.fr/en/online-age-verification-balancing-privacy-and-protection-minors) of current age verification methods. It found that no method has the following three important elements: “sufficiently reliable verification, complete coverage of the population, and respect for the protection of individuals' data and privacy and their security.” In short, every age verification method has significant flaws.
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Whether it’s called “age assurance,” “age verification,” or “age estimation,” there are only a few ways the technology can work. Verification usually requires a website or its contractor to analyze every user’s private information, like the information on government-issued identification cards. A potential alternative is for the website to communicate with third-party companies like credit agencies, but they are known for often having [mistaken information](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/common-errors-credit-report-and-how-get-them-fixed/#:~:text=According%20to%20a%20study%20conducted,terms%20of%20credit%20more%20expensive.). A third option is age estimation via facial analysis, which is used by Instagram. But such face recognition technology [has its own privacy and other problems](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/10/face-recognition-isnt-just-face-identification-and-verification), including clear evidence that [errors abound](https://www.newstatesman.com/social-media/2022/07/problem-instagram-new-child-age-recognition-software).
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EFF and many other privacy organizations have been concerned about age verification laws for decades. We [opposed](https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2004/06/29) a previous federal law, COPA, the Child Online Protection Act, which included an age verification requirement. It was [struck down](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashcroft_v._American_Civil_Liberties_Union) as unconstitutional nearly twenty years ago for limiting the First Amendment rights of adults.
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No one should have to hand over their driver’s license just to access free websites. That’s why EFF opposes mandated age verification laws, no matter how well intentioned they may be. Dozens of bills currently being debated by state and federal lawmakers could result in dangerous age verification mandates. We will resist them.
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## Related Issues
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---
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title: Security and Privacy Tips for People Seeking An Abortion
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source: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/security-and-privacy-tips-people-seeking-abortion#main-content
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author:
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- "[[Daly Barnett]]"
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published: 2022-06-23
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created: 2026-04-22
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description: Given the shifting state of the law, people seeking an abortion, or any kind of reproductive healthcare that might end with the termination of a pregnancy, may need to pay close attention to their digital privacy and security. We've previously covered how those involved in the abortion access...
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tags:
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- clippings
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- Privacy
|
||||
---
|
||||
[](https://www.eff.org/Privacys-Defender "Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance")[](https://www.eff.org/Privacys-Defender "Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance")
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|
||||
DEEPLINKS BLOG
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**Share It**
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||||
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||||
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||||
Given the shifting state of the law, people seeking an abortion, or any kind of reproductive healthcare that might end with the termination of a pregnancy, may need to pay close attention to their digital privacy and security. [We've previously covered](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/digital-security-and-privacy-tips-those-involved-abortion-access) how those involved in the abortion access movement can keep themselves and their communities safe. [We've also laid out a principled guide for platforms](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/what-companies-can-do-now-protect-digital-rights-post-roe-world) to respect user privacy and rights to bodily autonomy. This post is a guide specifically for anyone seeking an abortion and worried about their digital privacy. There is a lot of crossover with the tips outlined in the previously mentioned guides; many tips bear repeating.
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We are not yet sure how companies may respond to law enforcement requests for any abortion related data, and you may not have much control over their choices. But you can do a lot to control who you are giving your information to, what kind of data they get, and how it might be connected to the rest of your digital life.
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#### Keep This Data Separate from Your Daily Activities
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If you are worried about legal pressure, the most important thing to remember is to keep these activities separate from less sensitive ones. This can be done many ways, but the underlying idea is to keep that information compartmentalized away from other aspects of your "regular" life. This makes it harder to trace back to you.
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Choosing a separate browser with hardened privacy settings is an easy and free start. Browsers like Brave, Firefox, and DuckDuckGo on mobile are all easy-to-use options that come with hardened privacy settings out of the box. It's a good idea to look into the “preferences” menu of whichever browser you choose, and raise the privacy settings even further. It's also a good idea to turn off this browser's features to remember browsing history and site data/cookies. Here’s what that looks like in Firefox’s “Privacy and Security” menu:
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![Firefox remember history options in its privacy menu](https://www.eff.org/files/2022/06/23/firefox_history_menu.png "Firefox's "remember history" options in its privacy menu") 
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How to turn off Firefox's feature that remembers browser history
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If you are calling clinics or healthcare providers, consider keeping a secondary phone number like [Google Voice](https://voice.google.com/u/0/about) (which is free), [Hushed](https://hushed.com/), or [Burner](https://www.burnerapp.com/) (both Hushed and Burner are paid apps, but have significantly better privacy policies than Google Voice). Having a separate email address, especially one that is made with privacy and security in mind, is also a good idea. Some email services you might consider are [Tutanota](https://tutanota.com/) and [Protonmail](https://proton.me/mail?).
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#### Mobile Privacy
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One way to protect your privacy is to get a “burner phone” – meaning a phone that’s not connected to your normal cell phone account. But keeping a super secure burner phone may be hard for many people. If so, consider reviewing the privacy settings on your current cell phone to see what information is being collected about you, who is collecting it, and what they might do with it.
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If you're using a period tracker app already, carefully examine its privacy settings. If you can, consider switching to a more privacy-focused app. Euki, for example, promises not to store any user information.
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Turn off ad identifiers on your phone. [We've laid out a guide for doing so on iOS and Android here](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/how-disable-ad-id-tracking-ios-and-android-and-why-you-should-do-it-now). This restricts individual apps' abilities to track your behavior when you use them, and limits their sharing of that information with others.
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|
||||
While you're at it, it's a good idea to review the other permissions that apps have on your phone, especially location services. For apps that require location data for their core functionality (such as Google Maps), choose an option like "While Using" that only gives the app permission to view your location when it's open (remember to fully close out of those apps when you are finished using them).
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a "Find My" feature turned on for your phone, like Apple's function to see where your phone is from your other computers, [you will want to consider turning that off](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210400) before traveling to or from a location you don't want someone else being able to see you visit.
|
||||
|
||||
If you're traveling to or from a location (such as a clinic or a rally) where there is a likelihood law enforcement may stop you or seize your device, or if you're often near someone who may look into your phone without permission, turning off biometric unlocking is a good idea. This means turning off any feature for unlocking your phone using your face ID or fingerprint. Instead you should opt for a passcode that is difficult to guess (like all passwords: make it long, unique, and random).
|
||||
|
||||
Since you are likely using your phone to text and call others that will share similar data privacy and security concerns as you, it’s a good idea to download [Signal](https://signal.org/download/), an end-to-end-encrypted messaging app. For a more thorough walkthrough, check out [this guide for Android](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-use-signal-android) and [this for iOS](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-use-signal-ios).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Lock & Encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
Anticipating how data on your devices might be seized as evidence is a scary thought. You don't need to know how encryption works, but checking to make sure it's turned on for all your devices is vital. Android and iOS devices have full-disk encryption on by default ([though it doesn't hurt to check](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/use-built-in-security-and-privacy-protections-iph6e7d349d1/ios)). Doing the same for your laptops and other computers is just as important. It's likely that encryption is on by default for your operating system, but it's worthwhile to check. [Here is how to check for MacOS](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837), and [also for Windows](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/device-encryption-in-windows-ad5dcf4b-dbe0-2331-228f-7925c2a3012d). Linux users ought to check for guides for their choice of distribution and how to enable full disk encryption from there.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Delete & Turn Off
|
||||
|
||||
Deleting things from your phone or computer isn't as easy as it sounds. For sensitive data, you want to make sure it's done right.
|
||||
|
||||
When deleting images from your phone, make sure to remove them from "recently deleted" folders. Here is a [guide on permanently deleting from iOS](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205856). Similar to iOS, Android's Google Photos app requires you to delete photos from its "Bin" folder where it stores recently deleted images for a period of time.
|
||||
|
||||
For your computer, using "secure deletion" features on either Windows or MacOS is a good call, but are not as important as making sure full disk encryption is turned on (discussed in the above section)
|
||||
|
||||
If you’re especially worried that someone might learn about a specific location you are traveling to or, simply turning off your phone and leaving your laptop at home is the easiest and most foolproof solution. Only you can decide if the risk outweighs the benefit of keeping your phone on when traveling to or from a clinic or abortion rally. For more reading, [here is our guide on safely attending a protest](https://ssd.eff.org/en/playlist/reproductive-healthcare-service-provider-seeker-or-advocate#attending-protest), which may be useful for you to make that decision for yourself.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related Issues
|
||||
|
||||
**Share It**
|
||||
|
||||
Event registration form Event registration form
|
||||
+85
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: The KIDS Act Would Require Age Checks To Get Online
|
||||
source: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/kids-act-would-require-age-checks-get-online
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[Joe Mullin]]"
|
||||
published: 2026-06-25
|
||||
created: 2026-06-27
|
||||
description: Buried inside the KIDS Act are provisions that will push online services to verify all users’ ages, require government-directed moderation policies for online speech, and even create new rules about private and encrypted communications. While supporters continue to claim this bill protects minors online, its requirements come at the expense of privacy, free expression, and the
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- clippings
|
||||
- Privacy
|
||||
---
|
||||
[](https://www.eff.org/livestream-repair "EFFecting Change: If You Own It, Why Can't You Fix It? on July 23")[](https://www.eff.org/livestream-repair "EFFecting Change: If You Own It, Why Can't You Fix It? on July 23")
|
||||
|
||||
DEEPLINKS BLOG
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Within the next week, Congress is preparing to vote on the [KIDS Act](https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/H7757_SUS_xml_4b1ac8f00f.pdf), a sprawling package of legislation that seeks to control Americans’ web browsing and private messaging. The package includes a revised version of the [Kids Online Safety Act](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/05/kids-online-safety-act-will-make-internet-worse-everyone), or KOSA, combined with a collection of other internet bills, study bills, reporting requirements, and new regulations. Instead of debating any of these proposals on their merits, lawmakers are attempting to move them all at once under an ultra-expedited process.
|
||||
|
||||
The package of cobbled-together bills is a mess, with different age-gating schemes for different services, using different standards. It’s a lot of complexity, and a lot of legal risk. Faced with that, many companies will conclude that the safest option is restrictive age-checking practices across their entire platforms.
|
||||
|
||||
Buried inside the KIDS Act are provisions that will push online services to verify all users’ ages, require government-directed moderation policies for online speech, and even create new rules about private and encrypted communications. While supporters continue to claim this bill protects minors online, its requirements come at the expense of privacy, free expression, and the ability of people of all ages to use the internet without revealing sensitive data.
|
||||
|
||||
[Take action](https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-don-t-force-age-checks-online)
|
||||
|
||||
[Tell Congress to reject this age-gating bill](https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-don-t-force-age-checks-online)
|
||||
|
||||
### The KIDS Act Pressures Platforms to Check Everyone's Age
|
||||
|
||||
Supporters of KOSA have [said](https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/about/issues/kids-online-safety-act) the bill doesn’t require age verification. And technically, the KOSA section of the bill does say that KOSA shouldn’t be read to require age verification.
|
||||
|
||||
But if you read the rest of the bill, that disclaimer starts to look hollow.
|
||||
|
||||
Throughout the KOSA section of the legislation, special protections, controls, messaging settings, and parental tools are required whenever a website or app “knows or should have known” a user is a child (defined in the bill as anyone under 13) or a teen (defined as anyone between 13 and 16 years old).
|
||||
|
||||
The problem is a website operator doesn’t need actual knowledge that a user is a minor to get in legal trouble. It applies when a platform “knows or should have known” a user’s age—a low, negligence-style standard of knowledge. If an online service gets it wrong, it’s going to be up to courts and regulators to decide, after the fact, if an online service “should” have known a user was 16.
|
||||
|
||||
To try to avoid liability, services will have to determine which users are teenagers and which are not. Most won’t be able to simply trust their users. They’ll have to collect more information about age, before any lawsuit or government action arises. Some companies may respond by requesting driver's licenses or passports. Others will rely on age-estimation systems that attempt to guess users' ages by looking at existing activity or doing facial scans. Existing estimation systems make mistakes when estimating children’s ages correctly, which is a big problem when that is the population KOSA is trying to protect. And the systems fail more frequently for [people of color](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/sep/19/how-accurate-are-age-checks-for-australias-under-16s-social-media-ban-what-trial-data-reveals), [people with disabilities](https://www.wired.com/story/when-face-recognition-doesnt-know-your-face-is-a-face/), and [trans and nonbinary people](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359246).
|
||||
|
||||
The bill’s authors seem to know this is a problem. On the one hand, the new KOSA section says age verification is not required. On the other, it repeatedly imposes obligations that depend on knowing whether a user is under 17. But a disclaimer doesn’t magically eliminate legal risk, especially for smaller services and startups that can’t afford to defend lawsuits or fight regulators.
|
||||
|
||||
[Take action](https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-don-t-force-age-checks-online)
|
||||
|
||||
The "KIDS Act" Is an Age Surveillance Bill
|
||||
|
||||
KOSA is not the only part of this package that creates age-verification pressure. The SAFE BOTS Act, like KOSA, goes back to the standard that if a service “knows or should have known” that a user is a minor it can’t offer certain chatbot features.
|
||||
|
||||
The SCREEN Act requires services that host sexually explicit content to determine whether users are “more likely than not” under the relevant age limit, before allowing access to certain content.
|
||||
|
||||
The consequences of this liability will not be limited to minors. If websites and apps are expected to reliably identify teenagers, adults will be asked to prove they are adults. The result is a less private internet for everyone.
|
||||
|
||||
### The KIDS Act Pressures Platforms To Police Lawful Speech
|
||||
|
||||
The new version of KOSA removes the bill’s infamous "duty of care" provision, a significant change. The revised KOSA requires covered platforms to "establish, implement, maintain, and *enforce* " policies and procedures addressing several categories of content and conduct.
|
||||
|
||||
Some categories, such as true threats and sexual exploitation, involve unlawful activity. Others are much broader. The bill specifically requires policies addressing the "sale or use" of narcotic drugs, tobacco products, cannabis products, gambling, and alcohol. It also restricts discussions around financial fraud.
|
||||
|
||||
Sounds straightforward enough. Then you remember how people actually talk—online and off. Can teens discuss addiction and recovery? Can a 15-year-old post that she’s worried she has a friend who is drinking too much? Can they seek advice about a parent’s gambling problem, or get help if they or a family member have been scammed? Can they participate in harm-reduction communities or discuss substance abuse treatment? All of these young people would be engaging in lawful speech when discussing topics covered by KOSA’s enumerated harms.
|
||||
|
||||
The bill does not directly ban those conversations. But it places platforms under huge pressure to create and enforce moderation policies around broad categories of lawful speech. Faced with legal risk, many services will inevitably choose to remove that speech or restrict those discussions to spaces where they know only adults can participate. We’ve seen this movie before. When legal risk goes up, platforms [will take down](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/congress-censors-internet-eff-continues-fight-fosta-2018-review) more speech.
|
||||
|
||||
### The KIDS Act Regulates Private Messages, Too
|
||||
|
||||
Several provisions of the bill create new rules around direct messages, disappearing or “ephemeral” messages, and AI chat services.
|
||||
|
||||
The bill includes language stating that certain KOSA requirements should not be construed to override strong encryption. But the protection is incomplete. The carve-out applies to certain features and messaging controls, but doesn’t apply to KOSA’s separate requirement that platforms "address" a list of harms to minors.
|
||||
|
||||
The KIDS Act never answers an obvious question: how exactly is a platform supposed to address those activities if they’re inside encrypted communications that it can’t read? That will create pressure for providers to weaken private communications or limit features on encrypted private services.
|
||||
|
||||
That approach is especially troubling when it comes to ephemeral messaging. Disappearing messages are not a “loophole” or a dangerous design trick. They are a [useful privacy feature](https://ssd.eff.org/module/communicating-others) that allows online conversations to function more like ordinary real-world conversations, which are not preserved forever in a permanent database.
|
||||
|
||||
Like many other parts of the KIDS Act, these private messaging provisions also depend on websites and apps knowing who is a minor and who is not. The result is more age checks, more restrictions, and less privacy online.
|
||||
|
||||
[Take action](https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-don-t-force-age-checks-online)
|
||||
|
||||
[Tell congress: no online age checkpoints](https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-don-t-force-age-checks-online)
|
||||
|
||||
## Related Issues
|
||||
|
||||
Event registration form Event registration form
|
||||
|
||||
Facebook Container has disabled this button and blocked Facebook from tracking your visit to this page.
|
||||
|
||||
Facebook Container has disabled this button and blocked Facebook from tracking your visit to this page.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Who uses Tor?
|
||||
source: https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html
|
||||
author:
|
||||
- "[[The Tor Project]]"
|
||||
- "[[Inc.]]"
|
||||
published:
|
||||
created: 2026-05-10
|
||||
description: The Tor Project's free software protects your privacy online. Site blocked? Email [mailto:gettor@torproject.org] for help downloading Tor Browser.
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- clippings
|
||||
- Privacy
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Inception
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Tor was originally designed, implemented, and deployed as a third-generation [onion routing project of the Naval Research Laboratory](http://www.onion-router.net/). It was originally developed with the U.S. Navy in mind, for the primary purpose of protecting government communications. Today, it is used every day for a wide variety of purposes by the military, journalists, law enforcement officers, activists, and many others. Here are some of the specific uses we've seen or recommend.
|
||||
|
||||
We need your [good Tor stories](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/we-need-your-good-tor-stories)! What do you use Tor for? Why do you need it? What has Tor done for you? We need your stories.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Normal people use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- **They protect their privacy from unscrupulous marketers and identity thieves.** Internet Service Providers (ISPs) [sell your Internet browsing records](http://seekingalpha.com/article/29449-compete-ceo-isps-sell-clickstreams-for-5-a-month) to marketers or anyone else willing to pay for it. ISPs typically say that they anonymize the data by not providing personally identifiable information, but [this has proven incorrect](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2006/08/71579?currentPage=all). A full record of every site you visit, the text of every search you perform, and potentially userid and even password information can still be part of this data. In addition to your ISP, the websites ([and search engines](http://www.google.com/privacy_faq.html)) you visit have their own logs, containing the same or more information.
|
||||
- **They protect their communications from irresponsible corporations.** All over the Internet, Tor is being recommended to people newly concerned about their privacy in the face of increasing breaches and betrayals of private data. From [lost backup tapes](http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11048), to [giving away the data to researchers](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?ex=1312776000&en=f6f61949c6da4d38&ei=5090), your data is often not well protected by those you are supposed to trust to keep it safe.
|
||||
- **They protect their children online.** You've told your kids they shouldn't share personally identifying information online, but they may be sharing their location simply by not concealing their IP address. Increasingly, IP addresses can be [literally mapped to a city or even street location](http://whatismyipaddress.com/), and can [reveal other information](http://whatsmyip.org/more/) about how you are connecting to the Internet. In the United States, the government is pushing to make this mapping increasingly precise.
|
||||
- **They research sensitive topics.** There's a wealth of information available online. But perhaps in your country, access to information on AIDS, birth control, [Tibetan culture](https://web.archive.org/web/20120107130815/http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/tibetan-culture-website-shut-down-in-china-53327.html), or world religions is behind a national firewall.
|
||||
- **They skirt surveillance.** Even harmless web browsing can sometimes raise red flags for suspicious observers. Using Tor protects your privacy by making it extremely dificult for an observer to correlate the sites you visit with your physical-world identity.
|
||||
- **They circumvent censorship.** If you live in a country that has ever [blocked Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_of_Facebook) or [Youtube](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_of_YouTube), you might need to use Tor to get basic internet functionality.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Journalists and their audience use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- **[Reporters without Borders](http://www.rsf.org/)** tracks Internet prisoners of conscience and jailed or harmed journalists all over the world. They advise journalists, sources, bloggers, and dissidents to use Tor to ensure their privacy and safety.
|
||||
- Tor is part of **[SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/)**, an open-source whistleblower submission system that media organizations can use to securely accept documents from and communicate with anonymous sources. [Many news organizations](https://securedrop.org/directory) use SecureDrop, including the Associated Press, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The CBC, ProPublica, Dagbladet, and more.
|
||||
- Tor preserves the ability of people behind national firewalls or under the surveillance of repressive regimes to obtain a global perspective on controversial topics including democracy, economics and religion.
|
||||
- **Citizen journalists in China** use Tor to write about local events to encourage social change and political reform.
|
||||
- **Citizens and journalists in Internet black holes** use Tor to research state propaganda and opposing viewpoints, to file stories with non-State controlled media, and to avoid risking the personal consequences of intellectual curiosity.
|
||||
|
||||
## Law enforcement officers use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- **Online surveillance:** Tor allows officials to surf questionable web sites and services without leaving tell-tale tracks. If the system administrator of an illegal gambling site, for example, were to see multiple connections from government or law enforcement IP addresses in usage logs, investigations may be hampered.
|
||||
- **Sting operations:** Similarly, anonymity allows law officers to engage in online “undercover ” operations. Regardless of how good an undercover officer's “street cred” may be, if the communications include IP ranges from police addresses, the cover is blown.
|
||||
- **Truly anonymous tip lines:** While online anonymous tip lines are popular, without anonymity software, they are far less useful. Sophisticated sources understand that although a name or email address is not attached to information, server logs can identify them very quickly. As a result, tip line web sites that do not encourage anonymity are limiting the sources of their tips.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Activists & Whistleblowers use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- **Human rights activists use Tor to anonymously report abuses from danger zones.** Internationally, labor rights workers use Tor and other forms of online and offline anonymity to organize workers in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even though they are within the law, it does not mean they are safe. Tor provides the ability to avoid persecution while still raising a voice.
|
||||
- When groups such as the **Friends Service Committee and environmental groups are increasingly [falling under surveillance](http://www.afsc.org/story/iowans-rally-defense-civil-liberties) in the United States** under laws meant to protect against terrorism, many peaceful agents of change rely on Tor for basic privacy during legitimate activities.
|
||||
- **[Human Rights Watch](http://hrw.org/doc/?t=internet)** recommends Tor in their report, “ [Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/).” The study co-author interviewed Roger Dingledine, Tor project leader, on Tor use. They cover Tor in the section on how to breach the [“Great Firewall of China,”](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/3.htm#_Toc142395820) and recommend that human rights workers throughout the globe use Tor for “secure browsing and communications.”
|
||||
- Tor has consulted with and volunteered help to **Amnesty International's past [corporate responsibility campaign](http://web.archive.org/web/20090323052228/http://irrepressible.info/)**. See also their 2006 [full report](http://web.archive.org/web/20090530164605/http://irrepressible.info/static/pdf/FOE-in-china-2006-lores.pdf) on China Internet issues.
|
||||
- [Global Voices](http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/) recommends Tor, especially for **anonymous blogging**, throughout their [web site.](http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/projects/guide/)
|
||||
- In the US, the Supreme Court recently stripped legal protections from government whistleblowers. But whistleblowers working for governmental transparency or corporate accountability can use Tor to seek justice without personal repercussions.
|
||||
- A contact of ours who works with a public health nonprofit in Africa reports that his nonprofit **must budget 10% to cover various sorts of corruption**, mostly bribes and such. When that percentage rises steeply, not only can they not afford the money, but they can not afford to complain — this is the point at which open objection can become dangerous. So his nonprofit has been working to **use Tor to safely whistleblow on government corruption** in order to continue their work.
|
||||
- At a recent conference, a Tor staffer ran into a woman who came from a “company town” in the eastern United States. She was attempting to blog anonymously to rally local residents to **urge reform in the company** that dominated the town's economic and government affairs. She is fully cognizant that the kind of organizing she was doing **could lead to harm or “fatal accidents.”**
|
||||
- In east Asia, some labor organizers use anonymity to **reveal information regarding sweatshops** that produce goods for western countries and to organize local labor.
|
||||
- Tor can help activists avoid government or corporate censorship that hinders organization. In one such case, a [Canadian ISP blocked access to a union website used by their own employees](https://web.archive.org/web/20071015142759/http://www.cbc.ca:80/canada/story/2005/07/24/telus-sites050724.html) to help organize a strike.
|
||||
|
||||
## High & low profile people use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- Does being in the public spotlight shut you off from having a private life, forever, online? A rural lawyer in a New England state keeps an anonymous blog because, with the diverse clientele at his prestigious law firm, **his political beliefs are bound to offend someone**. Yet, he doesn't want to remain silent on issues he cares about. Tor helps him feel secure that he can express his opinion without consequences to his public role.
|
||||
- People living in poverty often don't participate fully in civil society -- not out of ignorance or apathy, but out of fear. If something you write were to get back to your boss, would you lose your job? If your social worker read about your opinion of the system, would she treat you differently? Anonymity gives a voice to the voiceless. Although it's often said that the poor do not use online access for civic engagement, failing to act in their self-interests, it is our hypothesis (based on personal conversations and anecdotal information) that it is precisely the “permanent record ” left online that keeps many of the poor from speaking out on the Internet. We hope to show people how to engage more safely online, and then at the end of the year, evaluate how online and offline civic engagement has changed, and how the population sees this continuing into the future.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Business executives use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- **Security breach information clearinghouses:** Say a financial institution participates in a security clearinghouse of information on Internet attacks. Such a repository requires members to report breaches to a central group, who correlates attacks to detect coordinated patterns and send out alerts. But if a specific bank in St. Louis is breached, they don't want an attacker watching the incoming traffic to such a repository to be able to track where information is coming from. Even though every packet were encrypted, the IP address would betray the location of a compromised system. Tor allows such repositories of sensitive information to resist compromises.
|
||||
- **Seeing your competition as your market does:** If you try to check out a competitor's pricing, you may find no information or misleading information on their web site. This is because their web server may be keyed to detect connections from competitors, and block or spread disinformation to your staff. Tor allows a business to view their sector as the general public would view it.
|
||||
- **Keeping strategies confidential:** An investment bank, for example, might not want industry snoopers to be able to track what web sites their analysts are watching. The strategic importance of traffic patterns, and the vulnerability of the surveillance of such data, is starting to be more widely recognized in several areas of the business world.
|
||||
- **Accountability:** In an age when irresponsible and unreported corporate activity has undermined multi-billion dollar businesses, an executive exercising true stewardship wants the whole staff to feel free to disclose internal malfeasance. Tor facilitates internal accountability before it turns into whistleblowing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Bloggers use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- Frequently we hear about bloggers who are [sued](https://web.archive.org/web/20060910122231/http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112541909221726743-Kl4kLxv0wSbjqrkXg_DieY3c8lg_20050930.html) or [fired](http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-06-14-worker-blogs-usat_x.htm) for saying perfectly legal things online, in their blog.
|
||||
- We recommend the [EFF Legal Guide for Bloggers](http://www.eff.org/issues/bloggers/legal).
|
||||
- Global Voices maintains a [guide to anonymous blogging with Wordpress and Tor](http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/projects/guide/).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Militaries use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- **Field agents:** It is not difficult for insurgents to monitor Internet traffic and discover all the hotels and other locations from which people are connecting to known military servers. Military field agents deployed away from home use Tor to mask the sites they are visiting, protecting military interests and operations, as well as protecting themselves from physical harm.
|
||||
- **Onion services:** When the Internet was designed by DARPA, its primary purpose was to be able to facilitate distributed, robust communications in case of local strikes. However, some functions must be centralized, such as command and control sites. It's the nature of the Internet protocols to reveal the geographic location of any server that is reachable online. Tor's onion services capacity allows military command and control to be physically secure from discovery and takedown.
|
||||
- **Intelligence gathering:** Military personnel need to use electronic resources run and monitored by insurgents. They do not want the webserver logs on an insurgent website to record a military address, thereby revealing the surveillance.
|
||||
|
||||
## IT Professionals use Tor
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- To verify IP based firewall rules: A firewall may have some policies that only allow certain IP addresses or ranges. Tor can be used to verify those configurations by using an IP number outside of the company's alloted IP block.
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- To bypass their own security systems for sensitive professional activities: For instance, a company may have a strict policy regarding the material employees can view on the internet. A log review reveals a possible violation. Tor can be used to verify the information without an exception being put into corporate security systems.
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- To connect back to deployed services: A network engineer can use Tor to remotely connect back to services, without the need for an external machine and user account, as part of operational testing.
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- To access internet resources: Acceptable use policy for IT Staff and normal employees is usually different. Tor can allow unfettered access to the internet while leaving standard security policies in place.
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- To work around ISP network outages: Sometimes when an ISP is having routing or DNS problems, Tor can make internet resources available, when the actual ISP is malfunctioning. This can be invaluable in crisis situations.
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Please do send us your success stories. They are very important because Tor provides anonymity. While it is thrilling to speculate about [undesired effects of Tor](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en), when it succeeds, nobody notices. This is great for users, but not so good for us, since publishing success stories about how people or organizations are staying anonymous could be counterproductive. For example, we talked to an FBI officer who explained that he uses Tor every day for his work — but he quickly followed up with a request not to provide details or mention his name.
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Like any technology, from pencils to cellphones, anonymity can be used for both good and bad. You have probably seen some of the vigorous debate ([pro](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/01/70000), [con](http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_4.html#kelly), and [academic](http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/anon.html)) over anonymity. The Tor project is based on the belief that anonymity is not just a good idea some of the time — it is a requirement for a free and functioning society. The [EFF maintains a good overview](http://www.eff.org/issues/anonymity) of how anonymity was crucial to the founding of the United States. Anonymity is recognized by US courts as a fundamental and important right. In fact, governments mandate anonymity in many cases themselves: [police tip lines](https://www.crimeline.co.za/), [some adoption services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed_adoption), [police officer identities](http://writ.news.findlaw.com/aronson/20020827.html), and so forth. It would be impossible to rehash the entire anonymity debate here — it is too large an issue with too many nuances, and there are plenty of other places where this information can be found. We do have a [Tor abuse](https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en) page describing some of the possible abuse cases for Tor, but suffice it to say that if you want to abuse the system, you'll either find it mostly closed for your purposes (e.g. the majority of Tor relays do not support SMTP in order to prevent anonymous email spamming), or if you're one of the [Four Horsemen of the Information Apocalypse](http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/12/computer_crime_1.html), you have better options than Tor. While not dismissing the potential abuses of Tor, this page shows a few of the many important ways anonymity is used online today.
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user